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I
INTRODUCTION
Exceptions to the hearsay rule grew out of intuitive beliefs about human na-
ture.1  Thus, dying declarations were thought to be reliable because dying de-
clarants hesitate to meet their Maker with a lie upon their lips.2  Excited utter-
ances are reliable because traumatic stress is believed to still the capacity to lie.
Statements to doctors are trustworthy because patients are believed to have an
incentive to tell the truth to the doctor.  Psychological science based on empiri-
cal study of human behavior played no role in the origin of most hearsay excep-
tions.  The exceptions, after all, came into being long before William James and
Wilhem Wundt established their laboratories in 1875 and 1879.3
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1. See 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).  In this treatise, Wigmore wrote:
We see that under certain circumstances the probability of accuracy and trustworthiness of
statement is practically sufficient, if not quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the
conventional manner [by cross-examination].  This circumstantial probability of trustworthi-
ness is found in a variety of circumstances sanctioned by judicial practice; and it is usually
from one of these salient circumstances that the exception takes its name.  There is no com-
prehensive attempt to secure uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness which these circum-
stances presuppose.  It is merely that common sense and experience have from time to time
pointed them out as practically adequate substitutes for the ordinary test, at least, in view of
the necessity of the situation.
Id. at § 1422.
2. The dying declaration exception dates back to the 1700s.  See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at  §
1430.  Wigmore notes that all courts have agreed, with more or less difference of language, that the ap-
proach of death produces a state of mind in which the utterances of the dying person are to be taken as
free from all ordinary motives to misstate.  Id. at § 1438; see also id. at § 1423, § 1443.
3. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1426 (“It can be said definitely that most of the exceptions
began to be recognized during the 1700s, and that the few remaining ones were not recognized until the
1800s; but that is all.”).
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Today, psychological science has made tremendous progress, and it is ap-
propriate to ask whether modern psychology supports or undermines the intui-
tive foundations of hearsay exceptions.  This paper explores this issue by ex-
amining three exceptions: excited utterances, statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, and the residual hearsay exception.  These se-
lections are appropriate because the focus is child declarants, and these excep-
tions play key roles in child abuse litigation.
II
THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
The origins of the excited utterance exception can be traced to the eight-
eenth century.4  The exception is invoked frequently in child abuse litigation.5
The exception is codified in Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which provides that the hearsay rule does not exclude statements “relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of ex-
citement caused by the event or condition.”6 The primary rationale for the ex-
ception is that statements are trustworthy when made shortly following a star-
tling event and while the declarant remains affected by the stress caused by the
event.  Traumatic stress is thought to lower the probability that statements are a
product of conscious fabrication.7
The excited utterance exception has three requirements.  First, there must
be an exciting event.  Second, the out-of-court statement must relate to the
event.  Third, the statement must be made while the declarant is under the
stress of excitement induced by the event.
Courts consider several factors to determine whether hearsay statements
were made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event.  We dis-
cuss these factors below, employing a two-step process.  We begin by outlining
legal principles.  The legal analysis will then be followed by relevant psychologi-
cal principles.  We conclude the discussion of excited utterances by grappling
with the fundamental question: Does traumatic stress still the capacity to lie?
Some of the legal factors involved in this determination include:
4. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1747.
5. For a collection of cases on the excited utterance exception in child abuse litigation see 2 JOHN
E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES §§ 7.32-7.33 (3d ed. 1997 and 2001 Cu-
mulative Supplement).
6. FED R. EVID 803(2).
7. See 6 Wigmore, supra note 1, at § 1747, in which Wigmore wrote:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective fac-
ulties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and
sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external
shock.  Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the
senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been
brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trust-
worthy (or at least as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing
the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be
received as testimony to those facts.
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Spontaneity.  For many courts, spontaneity is the most important factor in
determining whether a statement was a product of reflective thought or a spon-
taneous reaction to a startling event.  The more spontaneous the statement, the
more likely the court is to apply the excited utterance exception.  If a child had
an opportunity to reflect, the balance tips away from admissibility.
Questioning.  A child may make a statement in response to questions about
a startling event.  Courts agree that questioning does not necessarily destroy the
excitement required for this exception.  Thus, simple questions like “What hap-
pened?” do not destroy excitement or spontaneity.  As questioning increases,
however, and especially as questions become suggestive, the odds decrease that
the child’s statement is a spontaneous reaction to a startling event.
Lapse of time.  The longer the delay between a startling event and an out-of-
court statement, the less likely the declarant was excited when the statement
was made.  Courts agree, however, that lapse of time is not dispositive on the
question of excitement.  Delay is considered in relation to other factors shed-
ding light on excitement.  Several decisions state that when the declarant is a
young child, longer delay is allowable.  Courts approve delays ranging from a
few minutes to many hours.  At the same time, courts reject statements when
delay and other factors indicate lack of excitement.
Emotional Condition.  A child’s emotional condition is important in evalu-
ating whether a statement was made under the stress of a startling event.  If the
child was visibly upset or crying, the court is more likely to conclude the state-
ment is an excited utterance.  On the other hand, if the child was calm when the
out-of-court statement was made, or if periods of calm or sleep intervened, the
statement is less likely to gain admission.
Physical Condition.  A child’s physical condition may indicate excitement.
For example, if a child is injured or in pain, the child’s statements may be ex-
cited.
Speech pattern.  The manner in which a child makes a statement may indi-
cate excitement.  For example, pressured or hurried speech may indicate ex-
citement.  The words themselves also may evidence excitement.
Age.  A number of decisions indicate sensitivity to the age of children who
make statements relating to startling events.  The decisions suggest a belief that
younger children may be more excited by certain events than adolescents.
We now turn to the psychological aspects of the excited utterance exception.
In this section, we do not address every factor governing decisions about
whether the excited utterance exception may apply because, to our knowledge,
psychological research has never directly tested the hypothesis that stress in-
hibits the ability to lie.  Given the lack of empirical research directly on point,
we must conclude that, although the logic underlying the excited utterance ex-
ception is intuitively appealing, there is no empirical, scientifically sound evi-
dence to support it.  Implied in the excited utterance exception, however, are
two assumptions regarding psychological processes that have been studied by
psychologists.
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The first assumption is that stress disrupts the ability to perform mental
tasks efficiently. Specifically, when a person experiences stress, particularly
traumatic stress, the person may be less able to focus on the task demanded,
that is, less able to concentrate on performance.  The second assumption is that
lying is an effortful behavior that has mental costs.  To be believed, a liar must
provide a plausible story, consistent with what he or she has already reported
about the alleged event, a story that—to be believed—should be told with a
great deal of spontaneity.  Thus, a liar is required to expend mental resources to
lie successfully.  If we consider more generally these two assumptions about
psychological processes underlying the excited utterance exception, then psy-
chology may provide some useful information to the legal system.
A. Assumption 1: Stress Disrupts the Ability to Perform Cognitive Tasks
Efficiently
Psychological researchers have studied the effects of stress on several com-
plex cognitive tasks, such as decision-making, reasoning, and problem-solving.
It has often been demonstrated that performance suffers if individuals are ex-
posed to stressful conditions.  For instance, Keinan, Friedland, and Ben-Porath
studied the effect of the threat of electric shock on adults’ performance in a
multiple-choice analogy test.8 These researchers found that the multiple-choice
alternatives were not covered in a systematic manner, resulting in lower levels
of performance. Similar disruptive effects have been found by exposing indi-
viduals to dangerous or stressful environments (e.g., deep-sea diving, parachut-
ing, speaking in public),9 putting individuals in overly crowded or heated
places,10 or causing fatigue or sleep deprivation.  Many other stressors along
these lines also tend to decrease performance in a variety of tasks (from simu-
lated-military decision making to attention tasks).11  However, decrements in
performance are also related to the ease of the task and to the extent of practice
a person has with a task, such that stress is less likely to disrupt easier and more
practiced tasks.  Most studies on stress and performance have been conducted
with adults (as well as with animals), as opposed to children.12  Based on devel-
opmental theory generally,13 one would predict that young children would have
8. See generally Giora Keinan et al., Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Un-
der Physical Threat, 64 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 219 (1987).
9. See Chris Idzikowski & Alan Baddeley, Waiting in the Wings: Apprehension, Public Speaking
and Performance, 26 ERGONOMICS 575, 583 (1983).
10. See James Shanteau & Geri A. Dino, Environmental Stressor Effects on Creativity and Decision
Making, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 293 (Ola
Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993).
11. See generally KENNETH R. HAMMOND, JUDGMENT UNDER STRESS (2000).
12. Some of the few studies on stress and performance carried out with children concern test anxi-
ety and performance.  In these studies, children are often divided into high and low anxiety groups,
based on measures of anxiety, and their performance is then examined on various types of academic
tests.  See James Plass & Kennedy Hill, Children’s Achievement Strategies and Test Performance: The
Role of Time Pressure, Evaluation Anxiety, and Sex, 22 DEV. PSYCH. 31 (1986).
13. See generally Robbie Case, THE MIND’S STAIRCASE: EXPLORING CONCEPTUAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF CHILDREN’S THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE (1991); Kurt W. Fischer, A Theory of
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greater difficulty than adults at mentally coordinating the emotion involved in a
startling event, on the one hand, and intentional lying, on the other hand.
Thus, although the scientific evidence is indirect, it points to the possibility
that the legal assumption underlying the excited utterance exception may gen-
erally be correct, especially for young children.
B. Assumption 2: Efficient Lying Requires Mental Effort
Another area of psychological research relevant to assumptions underlying
the excited utterance exception concerns whether lying requires mental effort.
Although research on children’s ability to lie is reviewed later in this article, suf-
fice it to say now that lying, especially telling complex lies, can take mental ef-
fort (at least to lie well).  Consider the results of an experiment conducted by
Aldert Vrij and colleagues.14  These researchers compared the quality (e.g.,
amount and vividness of detail) and believability of statements by individuals
who were asked to tell the truth versus individuals who were asked to lie.  Indi-
viduals were required to describe a theft they had seen on videotape.  Informa-
tion was elicited with open-ended questions.  Only fifteen seconds before the
beginning of the interview, individuals assigned to the deception condition were
asked to lie about what they had seen.  Under these circumstances, several be-
havioral indicators (e.g., hand/finger movements, “ah” speech disturbances, la-
tency periods) reliably distinguished liars from truth tellers. Also, when the
statements were analyzed for content, the true statements were of higher qual-
ity (e.g., more detailed) than the false statements.  The authors concluded that
being required to lie spontaneously without preparation is a difficult task.  Such
difficulty reflects cognitive load and emotional discomfort.15  Similar conclusions
have been drawn when comparing the ability to detect high-stake lies versus
low-stake lies: The former have been found easier to detect than the latter be-
cause liars display behavioral signs of emotion and cognitive load.16  Research in
this area with child participants is sparse.  The few studies conducted with child
participants reveal that children show behavioral patterns similar to those ob-
served in adults.17
Cognitive Development: The Control and Construction of Hierarchies of Skills, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REVIEW 477 (1980); Jean Piaget, Piaget’s Theory, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 103 (Paul
Mussen ed., 1983).
14. See Aldert Vrij et al., Detecting Deceit Via Analysis of Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior, 24 J.
NONVERBAL BEHAV. 239, 264 (2000).
15. Cognitive load refers to the total amount of mental activity imposed on active memory at an
instant in time.  The major factor that contributes to cognitive load is the number of elements to which
a person needs to attend.
16. See  Paul Ekman & Mark G. Frank, Lies that Fail, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 184, 200 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saarni eds., 1993); see also Mark G. Frank & Paul Ekman, The
Ability to Detect Deceit Generalizes Across Different Types of High-Stake Lies, 72  J. PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCH. 1429 (1997).
17. See Aldert Vrij & Frans Willem Winkel, Detection of False Statements in First and Third Grad-
ers: The Development of a Nonverbal Detection Instrument, in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 221, 230 (Graham Davies
& Sally Lloyd-Bostock eds., 1995).
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Overall, these studies suggest that lying may be a difficult task, particularly
when individuals are not prepared to lie or are required to deceive regarding
important issues. The difficulty of lying may be further increased, as happens
for other cognitive tasks, by stressful circumstances.  It should be emphasized,
however, that individuals in the studies reported here were still capable of fab-
ricating lies even under non-optimal conditions, although they did so less effi-
ciently.  Future research should establish the extent to which the ability to lie is
compromised by stress, including traumatic stress, especially for children.
The heart of the excited utterance exception is the belief that traumatic
stress inhibits lying.18  On this key point, psychology has little direct evidence,
although there is indirect evidence indicating that individuals may lie with more
difficulty under stressful circumstances, as demonstrated by the fact that liars
are easier to catch under those circumstances. There is no evidence, however,
that trauma momentarily stills the capacity or motivation to lie.  The idea has
intuitive appeal.  Yet, at least for the time being, the theory underlying the ex-
cited utterance exception must remain just that, a theory, unsupported by em-
pirical evidence.  When it comes to excited utterances, modern research does
little to alter the ratio of intuition to psychological science.
III
THE MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT EXCEPTION
Certain hearsay statements made for purposes of obtaining treatment or a
diagnosis are thought to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence.19
Statements to physicians providing treatment have long been admitted.20  Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), statements for purposes of diagnosis alone are
18. The excited utterance exception has never been short of critics.  See, e.g., Angela Conti & Brian
Gitnik, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excited Utterance Exception to
the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 250 (1999) (“Stress does not prevent fab-
rication or inaccuracies.  Stress does, however, lead to distortion, confusion, and misperception.”);
Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Ex-
planations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928) (“What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the
desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant’s power of observation.”); I. Daniel Stewart, Perception,
Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 1, 28 (1970).
19. In this article, we do not address the difficult issue of the application of the medical diagnosis or
treatment exception to children’s statements to psychotherapists.  For a discussion of this issue, see 4
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 442 (2d ed. 1994); 2
JOHN E.B. MYERS, supra note 5, at § 7.39; John J. Capowski, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of State-
ments to Mental Health Professionals Under the Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L.
REV. 353 (1999); Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse Accusations and Statements for the Purpose
of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note (“Even those few jurisdictions which have
shied away from generally admitting statements of present condition have allowed them if made to a
physician for purposes of diagnosis and treatment in view of the patient’s motivation to be truthful.”);
see also 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at § 442; 6 WIGMORE, supra note 1,  at § 1722
(discussing the origins of the exception).
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also admissible.21  Most states have a version of this exception, although states
vary in the detail.22  Federal Rule 803(4) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the in-
ception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as rea-
sonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.23  
The primary rationale supporting the diagnosis or treatment exception is the
belief that statements to physicians are reliable because the patient has an in-
centive to be truthful with the doctor.24  The patient’s health—even  life—may
depend on the information supplied to the doctor.  This “patient incentive” ra-
tionale exists, of course, only if the patient appreciates the clinical significance
of candor.
In addition to the patient incentive rationale, two intertwined subsidiary ra-
tionales have been offered to support the exception.  The first may be called the
“Doctors are smart” rationale.  The second is the “They’re gonna hear it any-
way” rationale.
A. The “Doctors Are Smart” Rationale
Doctors are smart.  Moreover, doctors are motivated to diagnose correctly.
Because doctors are smart and highly motivated to “get it right,” doctors are
able—so the theory goes—to listen to patients, sort wheat from chaff, and in-
corporate only the former into diagnostic decisions.  Thus, because doctors have
special skill in assessing patient statements, hearsay relied on by doctors is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted in evidence.  Robert Mosteller points out else-
where in this issue that there is no particular reason to think doctors are better
than others at differentiating true from false statements.25  Certainly, no empiri-
cal evidence supports the idea that doctors are “smarter” than others in this re-
gard.
21. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
22. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the Hearsay Exception for
Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47
(2002).
23. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
24. See Meany v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940) (“A man goes to his physician
expecting to recount all that he feels, and often he has with some care searched his consciousness to be
sure that he will leave out nothing.  If his narrative of present symptoms is to be received as evidence of
the facts, as distinguished from mere support for the physician’s opinion, these parts of it can only rest
upon his motive to disclose the truth because his treatment will in part depend upon what he says.”);
see also 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at § 442.
25. See Mosteller, supra note 22, at 62; see also L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witnesses Under Rules
703 and 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 72 IND. L. J. 939,
961-62 (1997) (“No traditional exception to the hearsay rule relies solely on the person receiving the
statement to supply the heightened trustworthiness needed.”).
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B. The “They’re Gonna Hear It Anyway” Rationale
Rule 803(4) admits statements to physicians providing diagnosis only, with-
out treatment.  One type of “diagnosis only” doctor is a doctor retained to ex-
amine an injured litigant, diagnose the patient/litigant’s condition, and provide
expert testimony.  In reaching a diagnosis, the doctor/expert talks to the pa-
tient/litigant and considers the patient’s statements.  Of course, a patient who
retains a physician to provide expert testimony may lack an incentive to tell the
truth.26  Indeed, the patient’s motivation may point in the opposite direction,
toward exaggerated suffering.  With the primary rationale for this exception in
doubt, why admit statements to diagnosticians retained to provide expert testi-
mony?  The doctor/expert satisfies the “Doctors are smart” rationale, but that is
not the explanation.  The drafters of Rule 803(4) apparently reasoned as fol-
lows.  Under Rule 703, the jury will hear the doctor/expert’s diagnosis and the
data supporting it, including the patient/litigant’s out-of-court statements.27  Un-
der Rule 703, out-of-court statements supporting expert testimony are not of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted.  The statements can be considered
only insofar as they shed light on the expert’s testimony.28  Upon request, the
jury is instructed that it may not consider the statements for the truth.  Yet,
once the jury hears the patient’s out-of-court statements, it is unrealistic to ex-
pect them to ignore them.29  For one, you can’t unring the bell.30  Jurors are more
26. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at § 442 (“Statements for purposes of diagno-
sis offer no similar assurance of candor.”).
27. FED. R. EVID. 703 (requiring a balancing process when data supporting an expert opinion is
otherwise inadmissible).
28. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1720.  There, Wigmore writes:
A physician testifying as to a patient’s health may be asked, like any other witness, for the rea-
sons for his conclusions—either on direct examination, to show his opinion well founded, or
on cross-examination, to show it ill founded; and incidentally the fact that it is in part or en-
tirely founded on the statements of the patient or of others may thus be brought out.  Here, of
course, the patient’s statement has no hearsay quality; without regard to its correctness or in-
correctness, it enters merely as an observed fact forming part of the physician’s data.  It is pos-
sible to bring it forward in a testimonial shape; nevertheless, it is also possible, up to a certain
point, to treat it merely as a fact affecting the weight of the physician’s opinion.
Id.
29. See L. Timothy Perrin, supra note 25, at 940 (“[T]he [drafters concluded] that jurors were un-
likely to make the subtle distinction between statements admitted under rule 703 for the sole purpose
of explaining the expert’s opinion and the substantive use of the same statements for the truth of the
matter asserted.”); see also JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324.3 (5th ed. 1999)
(“Unfortunately, although limiting instructions are appropriate and required when requested, jurors
may be unable or unwilling to follow them.”).
30. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note, provides:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guarantee of
truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to tes-
tify.  While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was al-
lowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind.  The distinction thus
called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries.  The rule accordingly rejects the limita-
tion.  This position is consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert
testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by
experts in the field.
Id.
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likely to ignore the judge’s limiting instruction.  So, since “they’re gonna hear
the statements anyway” as support for the expert’s opinion, the drafters decided
the statements should be admissible both to support the expert’s opinion and
for the truth of the matter asserted.
The “they’re gonna hear it anyway” rationale hardly seems an adequate ba-
sis for a hearsay exception.  One need resort to this rationale only when out-of-
court statements do not qualify for admission in some other way.  Thus, if
statements qualify under the legitimate “patient incentive” rationale or the du-
bious “doctors are smart” rationale, the statements are admissible because they
possess indicia of reliability.  On the other hand, statements admitted under the
“they’re gonna hear it anyway” rationale lack indicia of reliability.  The recent
amendment to Rule 703 reflects the concern that jurors can be misled by inad-
missible information supporting expert opinion, and the revision of Rule 703
may solve the problem.  If not, Rule 803(4) should be amended to eliminate
statements to physicians consulted only to provide expert testimony.
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach: 1 + 1 = 1
In United States v. Iron Shell, the Eighth Circuit combined the “patient in-
centive” and the “doctors are smart” rationales into a single two-part test.31  The
court described its test in United States v. Renville, where the court wrote that
“first, the declarant’s motive in making the statement must be consistent with
the purposes of promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement
must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagno-
sis.”32
We refer to the Eighth Circuit’s approach as 1 + 1 = 1.  Insofar as the court
requires patient incentive, the court is on the right track.  As discussed above,
however, the “doctors are smart” rationale is dubious.  Thus, when the “patient
incentive” rationale is added to the “doctors are smart” rationale, the sum is
one legitimate rationale, not two; hence 1 + 1 = 1.
D. One and Only One Legitimate Rationale for 803(4)
We believe “patient incentive” is the only legitimate rationale supporting
Rule 803(4).  Hearsay exceptions are created because certain hearsay is reliable.
Statements for purposes of diagnosis or treatment are reliable if the patient has
an incentive to tell the truth.  The alternative rationales discussed above simply
do not hold water.  The medical diagnosis or treatment exception should apply
only when the declarant appreciates the clinical importance of candor.  This is
not to say the patient must fully comprehend the clinical implications of what is
said.  Few adults, let alone children, fully appreciate the clinical implications of
their interactions with doctors.  All that should be required is a showing that the
31. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980).
32. See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985).
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declarant had an understanding of the clinical importance of candor—an under-
standing that signals an incentive to tell the truth.
E. Do Children Understand the Clinical Importance of Candor with Doctors?
Rule 803(4) should not apply where a child—or an adult—lacks an under-
standing of the clinical importance of candor that is sufficient to signal an incen-
tive to tell the truth.  Absent clinical understanding, the statements may find
their way into evidence through another exception, but not Rule 803(4).  Thus,
we come to the heart of the matter: Do children understand the clinical impor-
tance of candor with doctors?  The answer is: It depends on the child.  Some
children possess the necessary understanding; others do not.  Age alone is not a
reliable marker, although it is difficult to imagine a two-year-old with the neces-
sary understanding.  With children older than two, however, case-by-case as-
sessment is required.  The four-year-old in one hospital bed may understand
quite well the need to tell the truth, while the ten-year-old in the next bed does
not comprehend the concept.
The medical and psychological literature contains relevant information
about children’s understanding of illness, routine medical care, and the role of
medical professionals.  From birth, most children in the United States have fre-
quent interactions with doctors and nurses in the course of health care mainte-
nance and in the provision of treatment for common childhood illnesses.  Janice
Genervo and her colleagues33 suggest that, because children’s contacts with rou-
tine medical care typically begin early in our society, occur frequently during
early childhood, and can at times be distressing, these experiences are likely to
be salient and therefore play an integral part in the development of illness and
medical representations.
As one would expect, children’s understanding of illness, medical care, and
medical personnel follows a developmental progression.34  In general, older
children’s understanding of illness and its causes is more complex and broader
than that of younger children.  Preschoolers in one study, for example, under-
stood that doctors “look at you” and “fix-up,” but most did not know the role
nurses play in medical interactions. 35  Second-graders, on the other hand, were
able to provide more details about the roles of doctors and nurses than pre-
school children.36  Julie Hergenrather and Mitchell Rabinowitz found that
younger children believed that changes in behavior, not symptoms, signaled ill-
33. See generally Janice L. Genevro et al., Young Children’s Understanding of Routine Medical
Care and Strategies for Coping with Stressful Medical Experiences, in CHILD DEV. & BEHAV.
PEDIATRICS 59 (Marc Bornstein & Janice Genervo eds., 1996).
34. See generally Daniel J. Burbach & Lizette Peterson, Children’s Concepts of Physical Illness: A
Review and Critique of the Cognitive-Developmental Literature, 5 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 307 (1986); Ellen
C. Perrin & Susan Gerrity, There’s a Demon in Your Belly: Children’s Understanding of Illness, 67
PEDIATRICS 841 (1981); Caroline C. Redpath & Cosby S. Rogers, Healthy Young Children’s Concepts
of Hospitals, Medical Personnel, Operations, and Illness, 9 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 29 (1984).
35. See Redpath & Rogers, supra note 34, at 29-40.
36. Id.
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ness, whereas older children understood that symptoms often signal the pres-
ence of disease. 37  In a review of the literature on children’s concepts of illness,
Daniel Burbach and Lizette Peterson found that older children conceptualized
illness in terms of specific symptoms and diseases, whereas younger children
conceptualized illness in more global terms and in nonspecific ways. 38  Older
children were also more aware of the psychological, affective, and social aspects
of illness than were younger children.
Even young children, however, can demonstrate a fairly accurate under-
standing about basic medical care, illness, and coping strategies.  Roger Bibace
and James Dillon observed in their study that young children frequently stated
that medicines are “good” because they make you feel better, that there are
both “good drugs” and “bad drugs,” and that there is a difference between
medicines for children and medicines for adults.39  In a study examining young
children’s understanding of routine medical care and strategies for coping,
Janice Genervo and colleagues found that, in general, four-year-old children’s
understanding of routine medical visits often includes information about vari-
ous procedures as well as affective responses.40  Gender differences were also
observed, indicating that girls’ understanding of going to the doctor is signifi-
cantly more complex than that of boys.  Additionally, children were aware of
various strategies for coping with potentially distressing medical experiences.
Although young children have been found to demonstrate developmentally
advanced forms of reasoning about illness, children often rely on less mature
forms of reasoning.41  Children often confuse the effects of a medicine with the
effects of the disease.42  Caroline Redpath and Cosby Rogers report that several
preschoolers in their study thought that people got sick or hurt in the hospital
and that doctors were the cause of illness.43
An illustration from the writing of psychologist Margaret Steward provides
insight into young children’s limited understanding.  Steward describes three-
year-old Sammy, who was knocked off his tricycle by a passing car, causing a
concussion and fractured skull.  When Steward visited Sammy in the pediatric
ward, he was a solemn little boy.  Steward talked with Sammy about being in
the hospital, and asked, “Are the doctors helping you get well?”  Sammy re-
37. See generally Julie R. Hergenrather & Mitchell Rabinowitz, Age-Related Differences in the Or-
ganization of Children’s Knowledge of Illness, 27 DEV. PSYCHOL. 952 (1991).
38. See Burbach & Peterson, supra note 34, at 307-25.
39. See generally Roger Bibace & James J. Dillon, What Children Want to Know About Medicine,
in PARTNERSHIPS IN RESEARCH, CLINICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 63 (Roger Bibace et al.
eds., 1999).
40. See Genervo et al., supra note 33, at 59-83.
41. See generally Roger Bibace et al., Toward a Coexistence Concept of Causal Reasoning About
Illness in Children and Adults, in PARTNERSHIPS IN RESEARCH, CLINICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL
SETTINGS 27 (Roger Bibace et al. eds., 1999).
42. See Bibace et al., supra note 39, at 67.
43. See Redpath & Rogers, supra note 34.
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plied, “No, the doctors are berry mean.”44  For Sammy, nurses—not doctors—
were “helpers.”  Sammy’s confusion is easy to comprehend.  The nursing staff
was ever-present and undoubtedly kind and nurturing.  Sammy had a warm re-
lationship with his nurses.  Doctors, by contrast, rush in unexpectedly, poke and
prod, stick you with things, ask questions, and then dash away without forming
much of a relationship.  Little wonder Sammy viewed the nurses as his only
helpers.
Steward offers another illustration of the limits of young children’s under-
standing.  In a study of kindergartners and third-graders, Steward found that,
although most kindergartners knew that a hypodermic syringe was used to give
shots, many did not understand why shots were given.  By contrast, most third-
graders, that is, eight- and nine-year-olds, knew shots were given to prevent or
cure illness.45
At times, children may misunderstand the purpose of medical procedures.
Some three- to six-year-olds, for instance, believe that medical procedures are
administered as punishment.46  Ellen Perrin and Susan Gerrity wrote that
“[c]hildren’s ideas regarding illness frequently involve punishment, guilt, and
self-blame. . . .  Hospitalized children often ascribe the cause of their illness to
disobedience of parental commands and interpret their hospitalization as rejec-
tion or punishment.”47  Daniel Burbach and Lizette Peterson observed that
“[o]lder, less anxious, and cognitively mature children seemed to reject the no-
tion that illness and misbehavior are related.  Younger, highly anxious, and less
cognitively mature children did perceive of illness in a moralistic way and, fur-
thermore, exhibited more self-blame for the etiology of illness.”48  In contrast,
John Taplin and his colleagues found that young children have a basic under-
standing of pain and its causes.  In a study concerning children’s understanding
of pain, Taplin and his colleagues wrote that, for children as young as five, “pain
is less likely to be regarded as a form of punishment for wrongdoing than as due
to a biological or physical/behavioral cause, even by younger children.”49  Taplin
concluded that “from a relatively young age [children] have acquired a basic
understanding of pain as a biological phenomenon and already know a little
about how it may be caused.”50
44. See generally Margaret Steward & David Steward, Children’s Conceptions of Medical Proce-
dures, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT: CHILDREN’S CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH,
ILLNESS, AND BODILY FUNCTIONS 67 (Roger Bibace & Mary E. Walsh eds., 1981).
45. See Margaret Steward & Gary Regalbuto, Do Doctors Know What Children Know?, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 146, 146-48 (1975).
46. See generally Roger Bibace & Mary E. Walsh, Children’s Conceptions of Illness, in NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT: CHILDREN’S CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND
BODILY FUNCTIONS 31 (Roger Bibace & Mary E. Walsh eds., 1981); Arlene B. Brewster, Chronically
Ill Children’s Concepts of Their Illness, 69 PEDIATRICS 355 (1982); see also Burbach & Peterson, supra
note 34, at 307-25 Perrin & Gerrity, supra note 34, at 841-49;.
47. Perrin & Gerrity, supra note 34.
48. Burbach & Peterson, supra note 34.
49. John E. Taplin et al., Children in Pain, in CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND
HEALTH 131, 134 (Michael Siegal & Candida C. Peterson eds., 1999).
50. Id. at 151.
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A recent study by Pamela Kato, Thomas Lyon, and Christina Rasco, which
reflects positively on children’s developing understanding, suggests that earlier
studies may have underestimated children’s understanding and reasoning abili-
ties concerning illness and punishment.51  Kato, Lyon, and Rasco wrote that
“when children as young as 4 years of age are asked to recognize the causes of
illness rather than to generate explanations, they show impressive understand-
ing. . . .  As in many contexts, children can recognize what they cannot articu-
late.”52  Further, the authors note that:
In this study, with a simplified interview technique, three-year-olds, especially healthy
three-year-olds, showed impressive abilities to distinguish illness concepts from moral
concepts: four-year-olds showed even more impressive abilities.  This is not consistent
with a large body of research that documents a developmental progression in chil-
dren’s understanding of causal mechanisms and moral blame.  This research claims
that children as young as three and four years of age are unable to understand causal
mechanisms and to assign moral blame.  The children in our study displayed these
abilities when asked to distinguish illness and treatment from moral transgressions.53
In addition, Kato and her colleagues found that “[c]hildren who show immi-
nent justice reasoning believe Nature is capable of seeking retribution for mis-
deeds, and they might also think that Nature intends to punish “naughty” chil-
dren with illness. . . .  Our data do not support the claim that children think that
illness and treatment are a form of imminent justice.  Our data do support the
claim that children have difficulty distinguishing illness and treatment from
punishment.”54   They explained that, “[c]onsistent with other research that uses
a simplified interview methodology, we found that significant numbers of young
children were able to show sophisticated reasoning skills concerning illness and
immorality when they are asked to recognize rather than generate reasons for
illness and treatment.”55  Finally, they stated that these findings “do not support
the current theory that claims that very young children have a primitive under-
standing of the concepts of illness and treatment. . . .  Children as young as
three and four years old in our study who were given simplified tasks and asked
to distinguish between immoral and ill characters were surprisingly proficient at
doing so.”56
The psychological literature suggests that young children do have a basic
understanding of the need to provide accurate information to healthcare pro-
viders.  Melody Herbst and her colleagues examined three- to six-year-old chil-
51. See generally Pamela M. Kato et al., Reasoning About Moral Aspects of Illness and Treatment
by Preschoolers Who are Healthy or Who Have Chronic Illness, 19 DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 68
(1998).
52. Id. at 69.
53. Id. at 74.
54. Id. at 68, 74.  The authors’ definition of “imminent justice” appears on page 68 of their article.
We incorporated their definition into the quote for purposes of clarity (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 75.
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dren’s medical knowledge.57  In their study, Herbst describes the three- and
four-year-olds as the “younger children,” while the five- and six-year-olds are
the described as “older children.”  Herbst wrote:
[O]ur data indicate that young children are more likely to report painful than benign
touch and that they understand the necessity to provide an accurate narrative to per-
sons in authority.  This suggests that, compared to [three- and four-year-old] children,
[five- and six-year-old] children were better able to distinguish what kinds of events
merit possible concern and need an adult’s attention and acknowledgment.  They of-
ten mentioned the presence of blood as a reporting requirement.  The [five- and six-
year-old] children, in determining whether or not to tell a doctor, also made the dis-
crimination between self-inflicted injury and injury caused by another—and were
more likely to report the latter.  These findings parallel research on children’s highly
accurate reports of painful medical procedures and suggest that even some very young
children have the capacity to meet the medical hearsay exception.58
Herbst asked the children about lying to a doctor:
Characteristic of the [three- and four-year-old] children were vague negative re-
sponses such as “You’re in big trouble now” or punishments such as a time-out or a
loud reprimand from the doctor. [Five- and six-year-old] children often thought that
the doctor would become angry; eight [out of twenty older] children understood that
the doctor would not be able to be helpful or would prescribe inappropriate treat-
ment. . . .  [Three- and four-year-old] children’s responses were characterized by cen-
tration and showed concern with possible punishment for lying. [Five- and six-year-
old] children were beginning to express a discriminated perception wherein lying pre-
vents the physician from being helpful or results in possible harm from inappropriate
treatment.59
Herbst concluded:
Both the three-to-four-year-olds and the five-to-six-year-olds could concretely de-
scribe what a physician does: [Five- and six-year-old] children were better able to de-
scribe concepts such as treatment and prevention functions and to identify the special
knowledge associated with the physician’s role than [three- and four-year-old] chil-
dren.  Neither group expected that the physician would know the cause of an injury
without being told.  Both age groups identified the truth as positive and [five- and six-
year-old] children tended to more readily identify lying as negative. [Five- and six-
year-old] children were significantly60 better than younger children at describing the
concepts of truth telling and lying and could also better understand potential conse-
quences of lying to a physician.61
This brief review of the psychological literature yields several tentative con-
clusions.  As would be expected, children do not possess adult-like knowledge
of health and illness.  Nor do children fully comprehend the roles of medical
professionals.  On the other hand, children as young as three and four years of
age have a developing appreciation of the role of “doctor” and of the impor-
tance of telling the truth.  As Herbst wrote, “even some very young children
57. See generally Melody R. Herbst et al., Young Children’s Understanding of the Physician’s Role
and the Medical Hearsay Exception, in CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND HEALTH 235
(Michael Seigal & Candida C. Peterson eds., 1999).
58. Id. at 247-48.
59. Id. at 250.
60. The author uses the word “significantly” in the scientific sense, meaning statistically significant.
61. Herbst et al., supra note 57, at 253.
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have the capacity to meet the medical hearsay exception.”62  It seems clear that
with children under the age of roughly seven, a case-by-case assessment is
needed to evaluate the child’s understanding of the clinical importance of can-
dor.
When we think about children and the medical diagnosis or treatment ex-
ception, we should also consider this analogous topic: children’s knowledge of
the legal system.63  Children do not have adult-like knowledge of the legal sys-
tem and the roles of legal professionals.64  Ask a child the meaning of “court,”
and the reply is likely to be: “A place to play basketball.”65  When asked the
meaning of the term “arrest,” a five-year-old answered, “It means you’re lying
down.”66  When the court clerk told a child he could “take the witness stand,”
the youngster thought he was allowed take it home with him.67  Children’s in-
complete, and sometimes mistaken, understanding of the legal system does not
mean they are incompetent to testify.  By the same token, children’s incomplete
and sometimes mistaken understanding of the medical system does not mean
they lack the incentive to tell the truth to the doctor.  The important question is
whether a particular child had the incentive to be truthful on a particular occa-
sion.
Medical professionals are aware of the clinical importance of getting accu-
rate information from patients.  Most doctors and nurses are less cognizant,
however, of the forensic reasons to ensure that children understand the need to
be truthful.  We urge training on this point for the professionals who examine
and talk to children.
F. Of Babies and Bathwater: What Does “Diagnosis” Mean in 803(4)?
Rule 803(4) admits statements for treatment or diagnosis.  Thus, statements
to physicians who diagnose only are admissible for the truth.  In the context of
803(4), the word “diagnosis” has at least two meanings, one of which is entirely
consistent with the “patient incentive” rationale of Rule 803(4); the other
meaning is not.
There are many occasions when patients have as much incentive to tell the
truth to non-treating diagnosticians as to treating doctors.  Consider radiolo-
gists.  The patient on the X-ray table does not expect treatment from the radi-
ologist conducting the procedure and asking questions.68  Yet, the patient has
62. Id. at 248.
63. See Ingrid M. Cordon et al., Children in Court, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL
JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (forthcoming) (on file
with authors).
64. See 2 MYERS, supra note 5, at §§ 6.40- 6.47.
65. See generally Karen J. Saywitz, Children’s Conceptions of the Legal System: “Court is a Place to
Play Basketball.”, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 131 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
66. Michelle Aldridge et al., Children’s Understanding of Legal Terminology: Judges Get Money at
Pet Shows, Don’t They, 6 CHILD ABUSE REV. 141, 145 (1997).
67. Id.
68. We realize that intervention radiologists provide treatment.  In most cases, however, the radi-
ologist’s role is limited to diagnosis.  We also realize that, most of the time, a radiologist is not present
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every reason to be truthful.  As another and very common example, treating
doctors routinely obtain consultations from other doctors.  The consultant’s role
is limited to diagnosis, yet the patient is motivated to tell the truth.
The “patient incentive” motive may be lacking when a patient/litigant hires
a doctor for the sole purpose of diagnosing the patient’s condition and provid-
ing expert testimony.  Although we cannot say how often the incentive is miss-
ing in such circumstances, we believe that when a diagnostician is hired solely to
testify, the patient/litigant’s statements should be excluded from 803(4).
Because the word “diagnosis” has two meanings—one of which is consistent
with the “patient incentive” rationale of 803(4), and another which isn’t—con-
demning all statements to diagnosticians is similar to throwing the baby out
with the bathwater.69  The key inquiry is to determine the patient’s incentive,
not to ask whether the doctor is a treater or a diagnostician.
The confusion generated by the multiple meanings of “diagnosis” will not be
remedied by striking “diagnosis” from the Rule.70  The Rule can stay as it is if
the bench and bar appreciate the dual meaning of “diagnosis.”  This is not to
say that the language of 803(4) is perfect.  We would prefer to see the Rule
amended as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness: Statements made for purposes of medical treatment, including diag-
nosis and consultation for purposes of treatment, and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.  
G. Stigmatizing Doctors in Hospital-Based Child Protection Centers
A number of commentators imply that doctors who work in hospital-based
child protection centers are little more than agents of the prosecution and that
children’s statements to such doctors should not be admitted under 803(4).71
Christopher Mueller is a dean of evidence, and we usually defer to him.  In his
superb treatise with Laird Kirkpatrick, however, we think the authors misstep
when they write “that doctors and social workers who interview children shortly
after abuse occurs often act almost as extensions of the offices of prosecutors
when X-rays are taken.  An X-ray technician takes the film, and a radiologist reads it later.  Neverthe-
less, there are procedures where the radiologist is present in the room conducting the procedure and
interacting with the patient.  Due to the joys of the aging process, the first author recently enjoyed a
little time on the X-ray table swallowing quantities of delicious barium and answering a radiologist’s
questions.  I had no desire to lie to the man.
69. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at § 442 (explaining that confusion over the
word “diagnosis” is deepened when the authors write, “Statements for purposes of diagnosis offer no
similar assurance of candor.”).
70. Timothy Perrin suggests eliminating “diagnosis” from 803(4).  See Perrin, supra note 25, at 996.
We are inclined to believe Professor Perrin is only worried about the doctor/expert, but we are not cer-
tain from his article.  See id.  In any event, we disagree.
71. See Perrin, supra note 25, at 1013 (“The doctor, psychologist, or social worker who conducts
the interview is often more like an agent of the police than a provider of medical treatment.  To the ex-
tent the doctor is acting more like an investigator than a doctor, the child’s statements certainly fall out-
side the contours of rule 803(4).”); see also Mosteller, supra note 22.
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and police, and in some urban hospitals special areas are set aside to collect
statements by abuse victims in order to qualify them under the exception.”72  Al-
though we concede there may be physicians who are “cops in white coats,” we
think it unfair to paint all hospital-based medical professionals with the same
stigmatizing brush.
Although we have great respect for Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, we
doubt they have spent much time interacting with the doctors and nurses who
work in hospital-based child protection centers.  Two of the present authors, on
the other hand, have years of experience with such professionals.  Perhaps it is
our experience that causes us to have more faith.  We believe that in many
cases, children’s statements to doctors working in hospital-based child protec-
tion centers have the indicia of reliability required by Rule 803(4).  The fact that
hospital-based professionals are aware of the forensic implications of their work
does not transform them from doctors into detectives.
H. Conclusion
Psychology sheds valuable light on children’s developing understanding of
the importance of telling doctors the truth.  Children as young as three and four
can appreciate the significance of candor.  Medical professionals should be
trained to instill in young patients the incentive required by the medical diagno-
sis or treatment exception.  With this exception, then, the ratio of intuition to
psychological science has been adjusted in the direction of greater psychological
understanding.
IV
THE RESIDUAL AND CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
We turn next to the residual and child hearsay exceptions that exist in most
states.  The discussion is divided into two parts.  In part one we discuss the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.73  In the second part we analyze the
criteria used by courts to assess reliability, and the psychological science that
bears on those criteria.
When a child’s statement does not fit under a traditional hearsay exception,
the hearsay may be offered under a residual or child hearsay exception.  Under
these exceptions the primary issue is reliability, and the starting place is Idaho v.
Wright.74  In Wright, the Court ruled that reliability is assessed in light of “the
totality of the circumstances.”75  The Court’s “totality” approach was consistent
with lower court precedent.  In one respect, however, Wright veered away from
precedent.  The Court ruled that the circumstances that are relevant to reliabil-
ity “include only those that surround the making of the statement and that ren-
72. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, at § 442.
73. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 819.
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der the declarant particularly worthy of belief.”76  A judge evaluating the reli-
ability of hearsay may consider circumstances immediately surrounding the
statement, but must ignore corroborating circumstances that do not surround it.
What circumstances immediately surround a child’s statement?  Wright pro-
vided examples, including spontaneity, consistency, motive to fabricate, and
“use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age.”77  As for non-
surrounding corroboration, the Court mentioned medical evidence and the de-
fendant’s opportunity to abuse the child.
Wright’s distinction between immediately surrounding circumstances, which
may be considered in assessing reliability, and corroboration, which may not, is
difficult to understand.  Justice Kennedy dissented, along with Justices Black-
mun, Rehnquist, and White.  Justice Kennedy wrote:
The majority errs, in my view, by adopting a rule that corroboration of the statement
by other evidence is an impermissible part of the trustworthiness inquiry.  The Court’s
apparent ruling is that corroborating evidence may not be considered in whole or in
part for this purpose. . . .  I see no constitutional justification for this decision to pre-
scind corroborating evidence from consideration of the question whether a child’s
statements are reliable.  It is a matter of common sense for most people that one of
the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is
corroborated by other evidence. . . .78  The short of the matter is that both the circum-
stances existing at the time the child makes the statements and the existence of cor-
roborating evidence indicate, to a greater or lesser degree, whether the statements are
reliable. . . .79
To appreciate the difficulty created by Wright, consider a case in which a
four-year-old’s hearsay statement describes anal intercourse.  An investigation
reveals six circumstances: (1) the child’s statement describing the abuse was
spontaneous, (2) the child had no motive to lie, (3) the child’s statement dem-
onstrated developmentally unusual knowledge of anal intercourse, (4) medical
examination a day later revealed a fresh laceration of the child’s anus, (5) the
defendant admitted that he did precisely what the child said he did, and (6) the
day after the assault, the defendant was observed secretly disposing of the
child’s bloody underpants.  Under Wright, only circumstances 1 through 3 im-
mediately surround the child’s statement.  Items 4 through 6 must be ignored in
the trial court’s assessment of reliability.  Yet, when is a trial judge justified in
placing the most confidence in the child’s statement?  When all six circum-
stances are considered?  Is it logical to place as much confidence in the state-
ment when items 4, 5, and 6 are ignored?  In general, the more evidence there is
supporting a proposition—in this case reliability—the better.80  It is only logical
to consider all six circumstances in the effort to assess reliability; it simply
makes no sense to ignore three circumstances that may, in this case, provide the
strongest evidence of reliability.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 821.
78. Id. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 834.
80. See EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 185-88 (1963).
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Our consternation with Wright’s distinction between immediately sur-
rounding circumstances and corroboration led us to empirical research in which
we sought to determine whether jurors intuitively recognize and follow Wright’s
distinction.  We realize, of course, that jurors do not apply Wright’s distinction
because jurors do not determine the admissibility of hearsay.  Nevertheless,
once hearsay is admitted, jurors decide whether to believe it.  If jurors fail to
grasp Wright’s logic—if jurors think corroboration is useful in assessing reliabil-
ity— then Justice Kennedy’s already convincing argument is even stronger.
In our study, jurors in real child sexual abuse trials examined a list of cir-
cumstances that might affect reliability.81  Some of the circumstances on the list
were of the “immediately surrounding” ilk; others were corroborative.  Jurors
ranked the degree to which particular circumstances helped in deciding whether
to believe children.  Jurors gave high rankings to numerous circumstances that
Wright held must be ignored.  For example, thirty-two percent of the jurors said
medical evidence was important in believing the child.  Fifty-one percent of the
jurors indicated that the defendant’s statements were important for their deci-
sion to believe the child.82  Jurors are instructed to use common sense, and the
jurors in this study apparently thought it made sense to consider corroborating
evidence in assessing hearsay.
A. Circumstances Relevant to Reliability
Courts consider numerous circumstances to determine the reliability of
hearsay offered under the residual and child hearsay exceptions.  We discuss a
number of these circumstances below.  We begin with legal principles, followed
by information from the psychological literature.
1. Testimonial Competence
a. The law.  The fact that a child was competent to testify at the time of
an out-of-court statement can impact reliability.  Competence at the time of the
statement indicates the child possessed the ability to observe, remember, and
relate events, as well as an understanding of the difference between truth and
falsehood, at that time.
The impact on reliability of a lack of testimonial competence at the time of
an out-of-court statement depends on the element of competence found want-
ing.  If the child lacked understanding of the difference between truth and
falsehood at the time of the statement, reliability may be diminished.  On the
other hand, if the child had difficulty communicating at that time, the impact on
reliability may be minimal.
81. John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 393 (1999).  Jurors who volunteered to participate in the research
were given a questionnaire after deliberations were complete and the jury rendered its verdict.  Volun-
teers took the questionnaire home, filled it out, and mailed it to us.  See id. at 393.
82. Id.
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Lack of testimonial competence at the time of trial may or may not impact
reliability of hearsay.  In Idaho v. Wright, the defendant argued that the child’s
out-of-court statements were unreliable because the trial judge found that the
child could not communicate at trial.83  The Supreme Court rejected defendant’s
argument, writing:
[W]e have in any event held that the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule
barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate
to the jury at the time of trial. . . .  Although such inability might be relevant to
whether the earlier hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness, a per se rule of exclusion would not only frustrate the truth seeking purpose of
the Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own “enlightened de-
velopment in the law of evidence.”84
It is important to ask why the child is incompetent to testify at trial.  If the
child lacks the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, this “disability” may
have existed at the time of the out-of-court statement.  On the other hand, if the
only reason the child cannot testify at trial is fear of the courtroom, the child’s
testimonial incompetence has no bearing on the reliability of hearsay.85
b. The psychology.  Our legal system requires witnesses to be competent
providers of information, that is, witnesses must be able to observe, remember,
and recall the events in question.  Witnesses must also be able to understand the
difference between truth and falsehood and understand the obligation to tell
the truth.
One of the requirements for competency is the capacity to remember and
recollect the event or events under investigation.  The child is not required to
remember the event perfectly; rather, the child must possess some recollection
of the event.  The empirical research on children’s memory is voluminous.86  The
literature reveals that the majority of children have the capacity to recall accu-
rate and relevant information.  Several factors influence children’s memory ca-
pacity, including the child’s age, the complexity of the event, the child’s famili-
arity with the event, and the delay between the event and the time at which the
event is recalled.  By age three, children can recall salient, personally significant
events quite well.87  Nina Hamond and Robyn Fivush found that when young
83. 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990).
84. Id. at 825.
85. See In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 2000); In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340 (Cal. 1997); State
v. Doe, 719 P.2d 554 (Wash. 1986).
86. See, e.g., CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING
TESTIMONY (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottom eds., 1993); SANDRA HEWITT, ASSESSING
ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE IN PRESCHOOL CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING SMALL VOICES
(1998) (“As early as 13 months, the capacity to construct and store memories of specific events is suffi-
ciently developed to allow recall over extended times”); (“Research with children as young as 2 and 3
years of age has found that they could give intelligible and organized accounts of daily activities they
had experienced, and they could also give accurate and detailed reports for novel, or one time events”);
DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR
HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998).
87. See Charles J. Brainerd & Peter A. Ornstein, Children’s Memory for Witnessed Events: The
Developmental Backdrop, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS 10 (John Doris
ed., 1991); Michael J. Farrar & Gail S. Goodman, Developmental Differences in the Relation Between
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children (between the ages of three and one-half and five) were questioned
about a trip to Disney World that occurred either six or eighteen months ear-
lier, all children, regardless of age, were able to recount a substantial amount of
accurate information.88
A consistent finding in memory studies, however, has been that young chil-
dren provide little information in response to open-ended or free-recall ques-
tions.  Older children’s reports tend to be more detailed than younger chil-
dren’s, and older children tend to report more spontaneous information than
younger children.89  Although very young children typically provide less infor-
mation, the information they provide tends to be accurate.90  Since young chil-
dren provide less spontaneous information as compared to older children and
adults, young children often require more direct questions to elicit information,
which may increase the risk of error in their statements.91
Psychologists have increasingly turned their attention to individual differ-
ences in children’s memory.92  Gail Goodman and colleagues, for example, in-
vestigated individual differences in children’s memory for a stressful medical
procedure called voiding cystourethrogram fluoroscopy (VCUG). 93  This proce-
dure is used to examine children with urinary tract problems.  The test involves
the insertion of a catheter into the child’s urethra.  Through the catheter, the
child’s bladder is filled with fluid, which permits the urinary tract system to be
photographed with X-rays as the child voids onto the examining table.  The
authors found that factors related to the child’s family predicted children’s
memory errors and level of stress, and that greater prior knowledge of the
VCUG procedure was associated with the number of correct responses to ques-
tions about the procedure.  Children’s emotional reactions also affected their
Script and Episodic Memory: Do They Exist?, in KNOWING AND REMEMBERING IN YOUNG
CHILDREN 30 (Robyn Fivush & Judith Hudson eds., 1990); Judith A. Hudson & Robyn Fivush, What
Young Children Remember and Why, in KNOWING AND REMEMBERING IN YOUNG CHILDREN 1
(Robyn Fivush & Judith Hudson eds., 1990).
88. See generally Nina R. Hamond & Robyn Fivush, Memories of Mickey Mouse: Young Children
Recount Their Trip to Disneyworld [sic], 6 COGNITIVE DEV. 433 (1991).
89. See id.; see also generally Peter A. Ornstein et al., Young Children’s Long-Term Retention of
Medical Experiences: Implications for Testimony, in MEMORY DEVELOPMENT: STATE OF THE ART
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 349 (Franz E. Weinert & Wolfgang Schneider eds., 1995).
90. See generally J. R. SPENCER & RHONA FLIN, THE EVIDENCE OF CHILDREN: THE LAW AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY (1990); Lynne Baker-Ward et al., Young Children’s Long-Term Retention of a Pedi-
atric Examination, 64 CHILD DEV. 1519 (1993); Hamond & Fivush, supra note 88, at 433; Peter A. Orn-
stein, et al., Children’s Memory for a Personally Experienced Event: Implications for Testimony, 6
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 49 (1992).
91. See generally Hamond & Fivush, supra note 88, at 433; see also Peter A. Ornstein et al., Young
Children’s Long-Term Retention of Medical Experiences: Implications for Testimony, in MEMORY
DEVELOPMENT: STATE OF THE ART AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 349 (Franz E. Weinert & Wolfgang
Schneider eds., 1995).
92. See generally Gail S. Goodman & Jennifer M. Schaaf, Over a Decade of Research on Children’s
Eyewitness Testimony: What Have We Learned? Where Do We Go From Here?, 11 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. S5, S14 (1997).
93. See generally Gail S. Goodman et al., Children’s Reactions to and Memory for a Stressful Expe-
rience: Influences of Age, Knowledge, Anatomical Dolls, and Parental Attachment, 1 APPLIED DEV.
SCIENCES 54 (1997).
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memory.  Children who were embarrassed about the procedure tended to pro-
vide fewer units of information in response to free-recall questions, whereas this
was not the case for children who were proud of having undergone the proce-
dure.  Thus, individual-difference factors related to children’s family, knowl-
edge, and emotions may affect accuracy and completeness of the memory re-
port.  Although researchers have begun to study individual differences, much
more information is needed to better ascertain how such factors influence chil-
dren’s ability to encode, retain, and recall information accurately.
Differentiating between truth and lies and understanding the obligation to
tell the truth in court are also essential components of competency.  Children
do not need to comprehend the subtleties of truth and falsehood.  Rather, what
is required is a basic ability to discriminate between truths and lies.  The child
must also demonstrate an understanding that it is wrong to lie or that the child
may be punished if he or she tells a lie. 94
By the time they are four, most children understand the difference between
truths and lies sufficiently to testify.95  In general, young children can distinguish
between truths and lies, as well as between lies and mistakes if asked to do so in
a concrete manner, using concrete examples.96  Kay Bussey, for example, found
that young children could appreciate the “naughtiness” of lying,97 and Jeff
Haugaard and colleagues found that most young children could understand that
a child who made an inaccurate statement at the request of a parent or friend
was telling a lie.98  Requiring children to define truths and lies, however, may
understate their competence, especially with maltreated children who tend to
lag behind in linguistic development.99  Thomas Lyon and Karen Saywitz found
that maltreated children under seven years of age often could not define “truth”
or “lie,” nor were they able to distinguish between the two terms.100  Most chil-
dren, however, were able to identify both truthful statements and lies, and they
recognized that lying was wrong.
To be deemed competent, children must also understand the obligation to
tell the truth and that untruthful testimony can result in punishment.  The child
94. See generally Jeff J. Haugaard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Children and the Truth, in COGNITIVE &
SOCIAL FACTORS IN EARLY DECEPTION 29 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1992).
95. See DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A
GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998); Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empiri-
cal Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (2000); see also generally Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Say-
witz, Young Maltreated Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16 (1999).
96. See generally Michael Siegal & Candida C. Peterson, Breaking the Mold: A Fresh Look at Chil-
dren’s Understanding of Questions about Lies and Mistakes, 32 DEV. PSYCHOL. 322 (1996).
97. See generally Kay Bussey, Children’s Lying and Truthfulness: Implications for Children’s Testi-
mony, in COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN EARLY DECEPTION 89 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds.,
1992).
98. See generally Jeff J. Haugaard et al., Children’s Definitions of the Truth and Their Competency
as Witnesses in Legal Proceedings, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253 (1991).
99. See generally Debbie Hoffman-Plotkin & Craig T. Twentyman, A Multi-Modal Assessment of
Behavioral and Cognitive Deficits in Abused and Neglected Preschoolers, 55 CHILD DEV. 794 (1984);
Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3
APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16 (1999).
100. See Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 99.
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does not need to understand or believe in divine punishment.  Rather, the child
must understand that punishment may come from any of a number of sources
including God, judges, or parents.  Many children are aware of the importance
of telling the truth in court.  Rhona Flin and her colleagues, for example, found
that the common justification for honesty among six- to eight-year-olds was that
lying could lead to being jailed or punished.101  By age ten, many children under-
stand the importance of telling the truth to determine the guilt or innocence of
a person.
In general, most children understand that telling lies can lead to negative
consequences.  For example, Candida Peterson, James Peterson, and Diane
Seeto reported that children (ranging in age from five to eleven years of age)
offered four types of consequences for lying: 102  (1) punishment (“God gets an-
gry at you,” “You get into trouble/belted/sick”); (2) destruction of trust (“It’s
not fair,” “People won’t believe you next time”); (3) guilt (“You feel terrible”);
and (4) don’t know.103  Peterson and her colleagues also found that, whereas
eleven-year-olds tended to justify the prohibition on lying in terms of trust and
fairness,  younger children mentioned punishment more often than eleven-year-
olds.
Recently, Kay Bussey examined children’s categorization and evaluation of
different types of lies.104  Children ages four, eight, and eleven were read twelve
vignettes of three different types of lies: antisocial lies (lies made to conceal a
misdeed), white lies (falsehoods not meant to injure anyone), and trick lies (lies
told for fun).105 The results of this study indicate that the children were able to
categorize false statements as lies and true statements as truths.106  However,
some differences between children of different ages were found.  Categorization
of false and true statements among four-year-olds varied across types of lies.107
Four-year-olds were more likely to classify false statements involving misdeeds
as lies than false statements involving interpersonal (white lies) or pretend
situations (trick lies).108  Regardless of context, older children were more likely
to classify false statements as lies than younger children.109  Bussey suggests that,
compared to older children, younger children may have more limited experi-
ence with white lies and, therefore, may have more difficulty categorizing inter-
personal false statements as lies.110  In addition, parents may be more reluctant
101. See Rhona Flin et al., Children’s Knowledge of Court Proceedings, 80 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 285
(1989).
102. See generally Candida C. Peterson et al., Developmental Changes in Ideas About Lying, 54
CHILD DEV. 1529 (1983).
103. See id.
104. See Kay Bussey, Children’s Categorization and Evaluation of Different Types of Lies and
Truths, 70 CHILD DEV. 1338 (1999).
105. Id. at 1339.
106. Id. at 1345.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Id. at 1343-44.
MYERS_FMT.DOC 12/05/01  11:28 AM
26 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
to label such false statements as lies than when labeling false statements about
misdeeds because parents sometimes implicitly encourage children to tell such
lies out of concern for others.111  Bussey also found that children, regardless of
age, were able to appreciate the wrongfulness of lying.112  Children across all age
groups judged lying as being worse than truth-telling.113  Thus, research suggests
that young children understand, although may not always be able to define, the
difference between truth and lies.  They are also able to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of lying compared to truth-telling.
2. Spontaneity
a. The law.  Courts consider spontaneity to be an important indicator of
reliability.  Of course, spontaneity is not always indicative of reliability.  As the
Supreme Court noted in Idaho v. Wright,  “it is possible that ‘[i]f there is evi-
dence of prior interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults, spontaneity
may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness.”114  Nevertheless, courts put
considerable stock in the spontaneity of children’s statements.
b. The psychology.  In the psychological literature, the spontaneity of
children’s disclosures of sexual abuse has been a topic of much debate.  One is-
sue concerns the process through which children disclose victimization experi-
ences, that is, how readily children disclose abuse.  A related issue concerns pa-
rental questioning of children when abuse is suspected.  We address each issue
in turn.
Because disclosure by a child of abuse is the starting point for many investi-
gations, one must understand how children typically disclose abuse.  The picture
that emerges from extant research, however, is far from clear.  Early research
was based largely on clinical observation of intrafamilial sexual abuse.  This
work suggested that disclosure is often delayed and halting.  In 1983, Roland
Summit described five aspects of children’s disclosure of sexual abuse:115 (1) se-
crecy and unwillingness to disclose; (2) helplessness (feelings of being unable to
alter the situation); (3) entrapment and accommodation (adjustment to the
abuse); (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction.
In another early study, Teena Sorenson and Barbara Snow examined 116 cases
from a larger sample of children who had received psychotherapy for sexual
abuse.116  Sorenson and Snow’s qualitative analyses suggest a disclosure process
111. Id. at 1344.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 807 (1990).
115. See Roland Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177 (1983).
116. See Teena Sorenson & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process of Disclosure in Child
Sexual Abuse, 70 CHILD WELFARE 3 (1991).
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similar to the one elucidated by Summit: denial, disclosure, recantation, and af-
firmation.117
Experimental and “scientific case studies” support the idea that the disclo-
sure process may include delayed reporting, secrecy, and recantation.118  Even
when children have no obvious motivation to conceal touch to their private
parts, such as genital touch by a pediatrician in a medical setting, some children
do not readily report genital touch in response to open-ended questions.119
Other researchers found low rates of initial denial of abuse and later recanta-
tion.  April Bradley and James Wood, for example, found that among 234 chil-
dren who were victims of sexual abuse, only six percent initially denied their
victimization, and only three percent recanted their initial allegations.120
Many factors influence the disclosure process.  For instance, age, relation-
ship to the perpetrator, fear of negative consequences, and attribution of self-
blame may influence the likelihood and process of disclosure.  Regarding age,
young children are generally less likely to disclose abuse to adults in a formal
setting, even when the children have already made an initial disclosure to a par-
ent or other adult.121  In addition, younger children appeared more likely than
older children to make accidental disclosures, without clear intention of re-
vealing the abuse.122
In addition to age, relationship to the perpetrator plays a role in children’s
willingness to disclose.  For instance, Maria Sauzier found that children who
had been allegedly abused by a natural parent or family member were particu-
larly reluctant to disclose the abuse, whereas victims of extra-familiar abuse
tended to reveal the abuse sooner after the incident.123  Sauzier also reported
that the methods used by perpetrators to obtain victim compliance were related
to the timing of the children’s disclosures; only about twenty-five percent of
children who had been psychologically manipulated and/or threatened by their
abuser reported the abuse immediately.  In a study involving children whose
cases were prosecuted in criminal court, Tina Goodman-Brown found that chil-
117. See Lori S. Gonzalez et al., Children’s Patterns of Disclosures and Recantations of Sexual and
Ritualistic Abuse Allegations in Psychotherapy, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 81 (1993).
118. See, e.g., Sue Bidrose & Gail S. Goodman, Testimony and Evidence: A Scientific Case Study of
Memory for Child Sexual Abuse, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 197 (2000).
119. See Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Genital
Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682
(1991).
120. April R. Bradley & James M. Wood, How Do Children Tell? The Disclosure Process in Child
Sexual Abuse, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 881 (1996).
121. See Kay Keary & Carol Fitzpatrick, Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse During Formal In-
vestigation, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 543 (1994).
122. See Leslie Biron Campis et al., Developmental Differences, J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 920 (1993); see also Marcellina Mian et al., Review of 15 Children 6 Years
of Age and Under Who were Sexually Abused, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223 (1986).
123. Maria Sauzier, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: For Better or for Worse, 12 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS OF N. AM. 455 (1989).
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dren who feared negative consequences to others and who blamed themselves
for the abuse were least likely to readily disclose their victimization.124
When children disclose sexual abuse spontaneously, they are most likely to
do so to their mothers, although friends, relatives, and teachers are also fre-
quent recipients of such unsettling news.  Children often make disclosures in re-
sponse to parental questioning once suspicion arises.125  Thus, it is important to
consider the effects of parental questioning on children’s accuracy.  Recent re-
search suggests that children may be less vulnerable to suggested responses
when asked misleading questions by their mothers compared to unknown fe-
male interviewers.126  This result was also confirmed in a study by Shelly Jackson
and Susan Crockenberg.  In this study, preschoolers were interviewed by either
their parent or a stranger, in either a misleading or non-misleading fashion. 127
Results indicated that children in the misleading condition were more suggesti-
ble when misinformation was introduced by a stranger than by their parents.
Nevertheless, misinformation from parents can, under certain circumstances,
distort children’s reports.128
In real cases, after interviewing their children, parents often tell investiga-
tors what their children disclosed.  A recent study by Maggie Bruck, Stephen J.
Ceci, and Emmett Francoeur investigating mothers’ reports of their conversa-
tions with their children demonstrated that the parents’ reports were accurate
regarding the gist of what the child said, but imprecise regarding the exact ques-
tions asked and whether the questions were open-ended or somewhat leading.129
There was a tendency to indicate that questioning was more open-ended than it
really was.130  This type of imprecision is not specific to mothers.  Michael Lamb
and his colleagues showed similar patterns for forensic interviewers.131  Al-
though adults are quite adept at reporting the gist what a child said, they may
not be as reliable at reporting how the information was elicited.132
Overall, regarding spontaneity and disclosure, it is hazardous to make de-
finitive conclusions from existing research.  Some children disclose easily and
124. See Tina B. Goodman-Brown, Why Children Tell: Disclosing Child Sexual Abuse (1995) (un-
published dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology (Los Angeles)) (on file with
authors).
125. See Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, The Effects of Disclosure and Intervention on Sexually
Abused Children, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 371 (1995).
126. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Mother Knows Best: Effects of Relationship Status and Interviewer
Bias on Children’s Memory, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 195 (1995).
127. Shelly Jackson & Susan Crockenberg, A Comparison of Suggestibility in 4-Year-Old Girls in
Response to Parental or Stranger Misinformation, 19 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 527
(1998).
128. See Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Suggestibility, in MEMORY AND
SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC INTERVIEW (M. Eisen et al. eds., 2001).
129. See generally Maggie Bruck et al., The Accuracy of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations with
their Preschool Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89 (1999).
130. Id.
131. Michael Lamb et al., Accuracy of Investigators’ Verbatim Notes of their Forensic Interviews with
Alleged Child Abuse Victims, 24 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 699 (2000).
132. See id.
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early, whereas others delay reporting and are reluctant to talk.  Still others re-
cant and deny that anything happened.
3. Questioning: Children’s Suggestibility
a. The law.  The reliability of a hearsay statement can be influenced by
the questions that elicit it.  As questions become suggestive and leading, reli-
ability can suffer.  Children’s suggestibility, and the competence of interviewers
are of immense concern to judges.
b. The psychology.  The psychological literature contains a large and
growing body of research on children’s suggestibility.133  Social scientists have
been interested in children’s vulnerability to suggestion since the early 1900s.134
Hundreds of studies have been conducted since the late 1970’s examining chil-
dren’s memory capacities and vulnerability to suggestion as these issues pertain
to eyewitness testimony.
What conclusions can be drawn from these studies?  The psychological lit-
erature on suggestibility does not reveal any simple relationship between age
and suggestibility.  Suggestibility is a complex process which is multiply deter-
mined by several factors including the interplay between cognitive, develop-
mental, emotional, social, and situational factors.  Despite the complexity of this
issue, psychological research supports two broad conclusions.
First, young children, particularly preschoolers, are often more suggestible
than are older children and adults.135  However, even preschoolers possess the
capacity to resist suggestive questioning.136  Young children have been observed
to recall highly accurate and forensically relevant information, even when
highly suggestive techniques were used.137  The second finding from the psycho-
logical literature is that as children near adolescence, they approach adult levels
of suggestibility.138  Although young children are more suggestible than older
children and adults, research indicates that the degree of suggestibility varies
considerably.139  Psychological research has begun to delineate the circumstances
under which children experience greater or lesser degrees of suggestibility.140
133. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Mary Lyn Crotteau Huffman, How Suggestible are Preschool Chil-
dren? Cognitive and Social Factors, 36 J. AM. ACADEMY CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 948
(1997); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave of Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1004 (1999); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’ Suggestibility
and False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359 (1997); Karen J. Saywitz et
al., Interviewing Children In and Out of Court: Current Research and Practice Implications, in APSAC
HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT (John E.B. Myers et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
134. See e.g., Gail S. Goodman, Children’s Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 157
(1984).
135. See Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Re-
view and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 403, 431 (1993).
136. See id. at 433.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 431-32.
139. See id. at 431.
140. Id. at 432.
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Children’s memory performance during free recall, for example, is found to be
highly accurate.141  As questioning becomes more specific, however, there is an
increased risk of error.  Studies that have examined children’s memory have
generally found that children are often least suggestible to questions about cen-
tral actions of personally experienced events.142  In contrast, when children are
questioned about peripheral details, particularly when the materials to be re-
membered are not personally meaningful, higher levels of suggestibility have
been observed.143  When suggestive questions are kept to a minimum, children
can be quite accurate.  In this regard, Maggie Bruck, Stephen Ceci, and Helen
Hembrooke state:
[U]nder certain circumstances children are capable of providing accurate, detailed,
and useful information.  For example, in many of our own studies [of suggestibility],
children in the control group conditions (who were questioned in nonsuggestive inter-
views) often recalled events flawlessly.  This indicates that the absence of suggestive
techniques allows even very young preschoolers to provide highly accurate reports, al-
though they may be sparse in the number of details.  Also, the results of a number of
studies of children’s autobiographical recall or memory for events indicate that chil-
dren’s recall is at times highly accurate and at times quite detailed about a large range
of events.  What characterizes these studies is the neutral tone of the interviewer, the
limited use of misleading questions (for the most part, if suggestions are used, they are
limited to a single occasion), and the absence of the induction of any motive or bias for
the child to make a false report.144
An important implication of studies that emphasize the strength of chil-
dren’s memories is that they highlight the conditions under which children
should be interviewed if one wishes to obtain reliable reports.  Again, when
children are interviewed by unbiased, neutral interviewers, when the number of
interviews as well as the number of leading questions are kept to a minimum,
and when there is an absence of threats, bribes, and peer pressure, then chil-
dren’s reports are at considerably less risk for taint.145
141. Graham Davies et al., Close Encounters of the Witness Kind: Children’s Memory for a Simu-
lated Health Inspection, 80 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 415 (1989); Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child
Sexual Assault: Children’s Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181 (1985); Ornstein et al., supra
note 89.
142. See generally Ornstein et al., supra note 89; Leslie Rudy & Gail S. Goodman, Effects of Partici-
pation on Children’s Reports: Implications for Children’s Testimony, 27 DEV. PSYCHOL. 527 (1991);
Karen Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Genital Touch: Implica-
tions for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682 (1991); Ann E.
Tobey & Gail S. Goodman, Children’s Eyewitness Memory: Effects of Participation and Forensic Con-
text, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 779 (1992).
143. William S. Cassel & David F. Bjorklund, Developmental Patterns of Eyewitness Memory and
Suggestibility: An Ecologically Based Short-Term Longitudinal Study, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507
(1995); William S. Cassell et al., Developmental Patterns of Eyewitness Responses to Repeated and In-
creasingly Suggestive Questions, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 116 (1996).
144. Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of Young Children’s Reports: From Research to
Policy and Practice, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 136, 146 (1998).
145. Id.
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Researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the manner in which
children are questioned.146  In general, when children are questioned compe-
tently, they can be reliable providers of information.  Interviewers, however,
differ in the ways in which they elicit information.  As previously stated, young
children tend to provide little information in response to open-ended questions,
which often necessitates the use of more specific probes to elicit information.147
Interviewers use a variety of techniques to elicit more complete reports from
young children, some of which may influence children’s factual recall and inter-
pretation of events.  The risk of suggestibility effects increases when interview-
ers introduce more suggestive questioning techniques.  Extensive use of mis-
leading questions and the heavy reliance on yes/no question forms, for example,
increase the risk of suggestion in young children.148
Social pressures that arise during the interview may also influence children’s
reports.  Stephen Lepore and Barbara Sesco conducted a study in which they
varied the style of the interview.  Some interviews were incriminating, while
others were more neutral relative to the incriminating interview style.  In the in-
criminating condition, interview style was manipulated by having the inter-
viewer reinterpret the child’s responses to questions about the “suspect’s” be-
havior.  The suspect’s behavior was reinterpreted as being wrong or “bad.”  In
the neutral interviewing style, the interviewer did not reinterpret or comment
on the child’s responses.  Lepore and Sesco found that children in the incrimi-
nating interview endorsed more negative statements about an innocent person
than did children in the neutral condition.149
Selective reinforcement of children’s responses has also been shown to in-
fluence suggestibility.  In a recent study, Sena Garven and her colleagues re-
ported that when children were reinforced for specific responses, children made
significantly more false allegations than did children who were not reinforced
for specific answers.150  In this study, children aged five to seven years in the re-
inforcement condition were praised by the interviewer when they answered
“yes” to questions.151  When children answered “no,” the interviewer expressed
disappointment.  Children who received reinforcement made thirty-five percent
false allegations whereas children in the control condition made false allega-
tions twelve percent of the time.152
Creating an “atmosphere of accusation” may also increase the risk that chil-
dren will make errors.  In one study, Gail Goodman and her colleagues created
146. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Re-
search and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33 (2000); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in
Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999).
147. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
148. DEBRA A POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN (1998).
149. Stephen J. Lepore & Barbara Sesco, Distorting Children’s Reports and Interpretations of Events
Through Suggestion, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 108 (1994).
150. Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on Children’s
Mundane Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38 (2000).
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id. at 42-45.
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an atmosphere of accusation by telling children that they would “feel better
once you’ve told,” and asking them “are you afraid to tell?”153  Children in this
study were questioned about an event that had taken place four years earlier.154
The results indicated that children made a variety of errors in attempting to re-
call the event and in answering questions, suggesting that the interviewer’s tone
and urgency may cause children to make erroneous claims about events for
which they have very little memory.155
Thus, research examining interviewing practices has shown that the ways in
which children are interviewed play an important role in children’s level of sug-
gestibility.  Highly suggestive interviewing techniques can increase suggestibil-
ity, even about central details of personally experienced events.156  These find-
ings have led some researchers to conclude that “the degree to which children
are suggestible depends to a large extent on how investigators conduct inter-
views.”157
Increased awareness that children’s suggestibility “reflect[s] failures in the
way adults listen to and question children” has led researchers to turn their at-
tention to the frequency of these problematic interviewing techniques in actual
cases. 158  Only a few studies have systematically examined the frequency of
problematic techniques in actual interviews.159  Amye Warren and her col-
leagues examined a sample of forty-two videotaped investigative interviews for
the frequency of problematic techniques, including (1) suggestive questions,
such as introduction of new information that the child has not provided; (2) so-
cial influence, such as telling the child that other people have already made al-
legations of abuse; (3) reinforcement, such as praise for abuse-related disclo-
sures or criticism of children’s responses; and (4) removal of the child from
direct experience, that is, asking the child to pretend or speculate. 160  Warren
was permitted to examine videotapes of actual interviews conducted by child
protective services workers.161  Children in the videotapes ranged in age from
two to thirteen years.  Overall, the results of the study were encouraging.  War-
153. Gail S. Goodman et al., Nearly Four Years After an Event: Child Eyewitness Memory and Adult
Perceptions of Children’s Accuracy, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (forthcoming 2002).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Sean Garven et al., More than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347 (1998).
157. Ceci, supra note 146, at 107.
158. See Poole, supra note 148.
159. Michael E. Lamb et al., Effects of Investigative Utterance Types on Israeli Children’s Responses,
19 INT. J. BEHAV. DEV.  627 (1996); Amye R. Warren et al., “It Sounds Good in Theory, But. . .” Do
Investigative Interviewers Follow Guidelines Based on Memory Research?, 1 CHILD MALTREATMENT
231 (1996).
160. Amye R. Warren et al., Setting the Record Straight: How Problematic are “Typical” Child
Sexual Abuse Interviews?, Paper Presented at the Biennial Meeting for the American Psychology-Law
Society (March 2000) (on file with authors).
161. Id.
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ren found that the occurrence of the problematic techniques outlined above,
when added together, was not high.162
In sum, questioning techniques can influence the degree to which children
are suggestible.  Although research has shown that children can provide accu-
rate information, suggestive interviewing practices may threaten the reliability
of children’s statements.  The extent to which these problematic interview tech-
niques occur in child sexual abuse cases requires further investigation.  The few
extant studies provide some encouraging findings but firm conclusions must
await further research.
4. Consistency
a. The law.  Reliability can be enhanced when a child is consistent over
time.  If the child’s description of abuse varies significantly with each telling, re-
liability (in the legal sense of the term) can suffer.  Complete consistency is not
required, however.  Indeed, as explained below, a degree of inconsistency is
normal in children.
b. The psychology.  Psychological research offers a complex picture of
consistency and its relation to accuracy.  There are several reasons for inconsis-
tency.  One explanation is that the child is lying and can not keep the story
straight.  Although some children fabricate accusations, deliberate fabrication
by children, particularly young children, appears to be very uncommon.163
Putting aside deliberate liars, what accounts for inconsistency in children
who are trying to tell the truth?  One explanation for inconsistency relates to
the way some children disclose abuse.  At first, a child may say nothing hap-
pened.164  Further questioning reveals a few details.  As the questioning contin-
ues, even more details emerge.  Finally, the child may recant and say nothing
occurred, only to recant the recantation.  Numerous other disclosure patterns
occur.  Clearly, it is important to find out why some children are inconsistent
when describing abuse and to avoid jumping to conclusions.
It is common for children, particularly young children, to give slightly differ-
ent versions of events each time they are questioned.  Betty Gordon and An-
drea Follmer observed that “[d]evelopmental research suggests that young chil-
dren may be less consistent than older children in what they remember over a
series of interviews.”165  Preschool children tend to be inconsistent when re-
counting their experiences mainly because the children recount new informa-
tion in each interview.  For example, Fivush and Hamond found that seventy-
162. Interviewers used problematic techniques in only “8.6% of all the turns on average across all
interviews.”  Id. at 6.
163. For the literature on fabricated allegations, see Myers, supra note 5, at § 5.5.
164. Louanne Lawson & Mark Chaffin, False Negatives in Sexual Abuse Disclosure Interviews: Inci-
dence and Influence of Caretaker’s Belief in Abuse Cases of Accidental Abuse Discovery by Diagnosis of
STD, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 532 (1992).
165. Betty N. Gordon & Andrea Follmer, Developmental Issues in Judging the Credibility of Chil-
dren’s Testimony, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL.  283, 284 (1994).
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five percent of the information preschool children reported in a second inter-
view was new. 166  Despite the fact that the children were giving “inconsistent”
versions, the information provided was quite accurate.167  When school-aged
children were repeatedly questioned, their recall tended to be more consistent
than that of preschoolers.168
Style of questioning is also relevant to consistency.  When open-ended ques-
tions are asked of preschoolers, consistency is fairly low, yet accuracy is quite
high.169  If specific questions are asked, both consistency and accuracy are typi-
cally found to be high, with some important exceptions, such as when specific
yes/no questions are asked of very young children. 170  Contrary to open-ended
or free-recall questions that leave children free to choose what information to
report, thus increasing inconsistency, specific questions provide children with a
precise cue of what is to be recalled, promoting consistency.171  Consistency and
accuracy, however, can be negatively affected by the type of questions asked.172
For instance, when preschoolers were asked misleading questions, they were
sometimes less consistent over time and also less accurate.173
Despite its forensic relevance, consistency has rarely been studied in rela-
tion to real-world child abuse allegations.  Ghetti, Goodman, Eisen, Qin, and
Davis compared children’s allegations of sexual and physical abuse across two
interviews. 174  Results revealed that older as opposed to younger children pro-
vided more consistent information in their reports of sexual and physical
abuse.175  In addition, girls were more consistent than boys in sexual abuse re-
ports.176
In sum, a degree of inconsistency is quite normal in children, especially pre-
schoolers.  Lack of consistency should not automatically undermine the reli-
ability of a child’s hearsay.
166. See generally Robyn Fivush et al., Content and Consistency in Early Autobiographical Recall, 14
DISCOURSE PROCESSES 373 (1991).
167. Id.
168. Judith A. Hudson & Robyn Fivush, As Time Goes By: Sixth Graders Remember a Kindergarten
Experience, 5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 347 (1991).
169. Robyn Fivush & J.R. Shukat, Content, Consistency, and Coherence of Early Autobiographical
Recall, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS  (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995).
170. Robyn Fivush, Developmental Perspectives on Autobiographical Recall, in CHILD VICTIMS,




173. Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Effects of Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testi-
mony of Children and Adults, 27 DEV. PSYCHOL. 975 (1991); see also Debra A. Poole & L.T. White,
Tell Me Again and Again: Stability and Change in the Repeated Testimonies of Children and Adults, in
MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS 24 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995).
174. Simona Ghetti et al., Consistency in Children’s Reports of Sexual and Physical Abuse, 26 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT (forthcoming 2002) (on file with authors).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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5. Developmentally Unusual Sexual Knowledge
a. The law.  In Idaho v. Wright,177 the Court recognized that developmen-
tally unusual sexual knowledge in a young child points toward reliability.
Young children lack the experience to fabricate or fantasize detailed accounts
of sexual acts.  Naturally, one must take care to rule out benign explanations for
a child’s developmentally unusual sexual knowledge.
b. The psychology.  Research on nonabused children’s sexual knowledge
has taken two forms: One method is to ask children what they know about
sexuality (for example, where babies come from); another is to examine chil-
dren’s behavior.  Not surprisingly, when children are asked about sexual knowl-
edge, a developmental progression emerges: Young, nonabused children typi-
cally know little about adult sexuality.178  Some children have more sexual
knowledge than others depending upon factors such as sex education by par-
ents, siblings, or peers.  Others have culturally related values or experiences and
exposure to sexually tinged media.179
177. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
178. Melissa M. Berends & Sandra L. Caron, Children’s Understanding and Knowledge of Contra-
ception and Birth: A Developmental Approach, 20 J. SEX EDUC. & THERAPY 18 (1994); RONALD J.
GOLDMAN & JULIET D. GOLDMAN, SHOW ME YOURS (1982).
179. See Berends & Caron, supra note 178; see also Barbara Boat & Mark Everson, Use of Ana-
tomical Dolls in Sexual Abuse Evaluations: Current Research and Practice, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD
WITNESSES (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993); Sonja N. Brilleslijper-Kater & Herman
E.M. Baartman, What Do Young Children Know About Sex? Research on the Sexual Knowledge of
Children Between the Ages of 2 and 6 Years, 9 CHILD ABUSE REVIEW 166 (2000); Roberta Paikoff,
Early Heterosexual Debut: Situations of Sexual Possibility During the Transition to Adolescence, 65 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 389 (1995).  Brilleslijper-Kater and Baartman conclude their research with
these comments:
The outcome of this study suggests that young children have very little sexual knowledge.
They only possess a certain basic knowledge of genital differences, gender identity, sexual
body parts and (non-sexual) functions of the genitals.  Knowledge of pregnancy, birth, repro-
duction and adult sexual behaviour is very limited and decreases in the order listed.  Only 5-
and 6-year-olds can tell us something about these areas, but their knowledge is still very lim-
ited.  Younger children generally know less than older ones.  2-year-olds know less than each
of the other age groups in all assessed areas of sexuality.  As well as assuming that 2-year-olds
really have less knowledge, verbal limitations should also be taken into account.  These results
are in agreement with other theoretical findings on the sexual development of children . . . .
Although parents nowadays consider it important to talk about sexuality even with young
children, they still find it difficult to actually do so.  Topics with which children are normally
confronted, such as genital differences, pregnancy and birth, are easy for parents to discuss,
whereas topics which are normally remote from children, such as sexual intercourse, sexual
abuse and sexuality (not including reproduction), are considered to be difficult.  This is for the
most part attributable to the fact that children themselves appear to ask about things they no-
tice which lead to curiosity, while they simply do not think about topics that do not occur in
their lives.  This also fits in with children’s knowledge of differences between physical intimacy
and sexual interactions.  Children who have never been confronted with sexual abuse inter-
pret daily intimate interactions between adults and children in terms of their own (‘innocent’)
daily intimate sexual action experiences or curiosity and do not use sexual terms.
When comparing all the data presented in this article with statements of alleged sexually
abused young children, who often appear to describe sexual interactions in a very vivid way,
one can conclude that detailed sexual knowledge in young children should at least be re-
garded as a warning signal.  Enlarging the group of non-abused children and comparing the
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Children’s sexual behavior is another way to index sexual knowledge.  Wil-
liam Friedrich and his colleagues gathered information on sexual behavior in
nonabused children aged two through twelve.180  In 1990, Friedrich wrote that
nonabused children “exhibit a wide variety of sexual behavior at relatively high
frequencies, such as self-stimulatory behavior and exhibitionism.”181  Although
sexual behavior is normal during childhood, there are a number of behaviors
that are quite unusual among nonabused children.  Friedrich wrote that these
unusual behaviors tend to be those “that are either more aggressive or more
imitative of adult sexual behavior.”182  In Friedrich’s study, the sexual behaviors
observed least often in nonabused children were: placing the child’s mouth on a
sex part; asking to engage in sex acts; masturbating with an object; inserting
objects in the vagina or anus; imitating intercourse; making sexual sounds;
French kissing; undressing other people; asking to watch sexually explicit televi-
sion; and imitating sexual behavior with dolls.183  The fact that a child demon-
strates one or more of these uncommon sexual behaviors, however, is not con-
clusive proof that their hearsay statements are reliable.  Friedrich reminds us
that “sexual behavior in children is related to the child’s family context, most
specifically, sexual behavior in the family.”184  Nevertheless, developmentally
unusual sexual knowledge is a marker for sexual abuse.
In 1998, Friedrich and his colleagues updated their research on sexual be-
havior in nonabused children.185  The later research is consistent with the earlier
work.  Friedrich wrote that “[i]t is important to remember that children’s be-
havior must be interpreted in light of individual and family variables. . . .  Al-
though sexual behavior is normative, excessive sexual behavior appears related
to other behavioral problems including sexual abuse.”186
Friedrich is not alone in studying sexual behavior in children.  The work of
other researchers in the United States and Europe is consistent with Friedrich’s
findings.187
results with those of abused children will enable us to diagnose age-inappropriate and hence
deviant sexual knowledge.
Id. at 177-78.
180. See generally William N. Friedrich et al., Normative Sexual Behavior in Children, 88
PEDIATRICS 456 (1991).
181. Id. at 462.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 463.
185. William N. Friedrich et al., Normative Sexual Behavior in Children: A Contemporary Sample,
101 PEDIATRICS 9 (1998).
186. Id.; see also William N. Friedrich et al., Child Sexual Abuse Inventory: Normative, Psychiatric,
and Sexual Abuse Comparisons, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 37 (2001).
187. See Brilleslijper-Kater, supra note 179; Jon R. Conte et al., Evaluating Children’s Reports of
Sexual Abuse: Results from a Survey of Professionals, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 428 (1991); Mar-
sha L. Heiman et al., A Comparative Survey of Beliefs About “Normal” Childhood Sexual Behaviors, 22
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 289 (1998); Frank Lindblad et al., Preschoolers’ Sexual Behavior at Daycare
Centers: An Epidemiological Study, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 569 (1995); Susan Phipps-Yonas et
al., Sexuality in Early Childhood, 23 CURA REPORTER 1-5 (1993); Eric Schoentjes et al., Child Sexual
Behavior Inventory: A Dutch-Speaking Normative Sample, 104 PEDIATRICS 885 (1999); Robert Wells
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6. Motive to Fabricate
a. The law.  Evidence that the child has a motive to lie impacts reliabil-
ity.  So, too, does evidence that an adult had a motive to coach or threaten the
child.
b. The psychology.  To be reliable, children must be able to speak the
truth about events.  If detected, untrue statements or any apparent motivation
to lie, could discredit children’s evidence.  Legal scholars, psychologists, and the
public in general often have conflicting beliefs about children’s capacity to lie.
For example, John Wigmore argued that children have a “childish disposition to
weave romances and to treat imagination for verity.”188  Jean Piaget believed
that children under eight years of age “spontaneously alter the truth and . . . this
seems to them perfectly natural and completely harmless.”189  When asked about
the trustworthiness of children, college students believe that young children are
highly prone to lie.190  Others, however, argue that children are too innocent to
lie willfully and also lack the cognitive capacity or maliciousness to lie, particu-
larly during testimony.191  Given these conflicting opinions, it is important to ex-
amine the extant data to determine whether or not young children have the ca-
pacity to lie.  If so, one must examine what motivates young children to lie.
Establishing a definitive age for the emergence of lying is difficult.  This is
partly because most theoretically based research has focused on children’s rea-
soning about lying rather than on children’s production of lies.192  Some re-
searchers who study children’s understanding of the mental states of others
(theory-of-mind researchers) have concluded that genuine deception is not pos-
sible until the age of four.  This view is based on research indicating that most
children under the age of four years are unable to pass false-belief tasks.  False-
belief tasks involve situations in which the child must understand that another
person can hold beliefs that are inconsistent or contradictory to the actual state
of reality.  Theory-of-mind researchers argue that a child must first understand
that others are capable of forming a false belief before the child can intention-
ally attempt to create a false belief through deceptive actions.  For example,
et al., A Validation Study of the Structured Interview of Symptoms Associated with Sexual Abuse
(SASA) Using Three Samples of Sexually Abused, Allegedly Abused, and Nonabused Boys, 21 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1159 (1997); Robert D. Wells et al., Emotional, Behavioral, and Physical Symp-
toms Reported by Parents of Sexually Abused, Nonabused, and Allegedly Abused Prepubescent Females,
19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 155 (1995).
188. JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 160 (1940).
189. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 166 (1965).
190. Michael E. Vasek, Lying as a Skill: The Development of Deception in Children, in DECEPTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN AND NONHUMAN DECEIT 271 (Robert W. Mitchell & Nicholas Thompson
eds., 1986).
191. See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, A Judicial Dilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 19 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 185 (1991).
192. Carol S. Tate et al., Adults’ Liability for Children’s Lie-Ability: Can Adults Coach Children to
Lie Successfully?, in COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN EARLY DECEPTION 69 (Stephen J. Ceci et
al. eds., 1992).
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Beate Sodian found that even simple deception was extremely difficult for
three-year-old children. 193  In a series of three experiments, children ages three
to five years were asked to point deceptively to a pair of boxes, one of which
contained golden stars and one which did not.194  Children were shown two pup-
pets, a king (who would give the stars to the child) and a robber (who would
keep the stars for himself).195  The child was to help the king obtain the stars,
while preventing the robber from obtaining them.196  They could prevent the
robber from obtaining the stars by deceptively pointing to the wrong box.197  The
results indicated that only the four- and five-year-olds consistently deceived the
robber puppet by pointing to the wrong box across two trials.198  Three-year-old
children would often point to the correct box rather than deceptively to the
empty box.199
Anecdotal evidence, however, seems to contradict the assumption that chil-
dren under the age of four are incapable of deception.  Several studies of natu-
rally occurring deceptive behaviors indicate that children younger than four en-
gage in acts of deception.200  Paul Newton found that when parents of three- and
four-year-olds were questioned about the age at which they believed children
started to lie, most parents placed the age at three and one-half rather than four
years of age. 201  When parents were asked to rate specific detailed examples, lies
from even younger children were rated by parents as deliberate lies.202
Studies conducted in a laboratory setting also found that children under four
years of age are capable of deceptive behavior.  Michael Lewis, Catherine Stan-
ger, and Margaret Sullivan, for example, examined children’s ability to inten-
tionally hide their emotional expressions.203  Three-year-olds were instructed not
to peek at a toy while the experimenter left the room.204  When the experimenter
193. Beate Sodian, The Development of Deception in Young Children, 9 BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL.
173 (1991).
194. Id. at 185.
195. Id. at 176-77.
196. Id. at 177.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 185.
199. Id. at 182-85.
200. Suzanne Chevalier-Skolnikoff, An Exploration of the Ontogeny of Deception in Human Beings
and Nonhuman Primates, in DECEPTION: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN AND NONHUMAN DECEIT 205
(Robert W. Mitchell & Nicholas S. Thompson eds., 1986); JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL
UNDERSTANDING (1988); Judy Dunn, Young Children’s Understanding of Other People: Evidence
from Observations Within the Family, in CHILDREN’S THEORIES OF MIND (Chris Moore & Douglas
Frye eds., 1991); Judy Dunn, Understanding Others: Evidence from Naturalistic Studies of Children, in
NATURAL THEORIES OF MIND: EVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENT AND SIMULATION OF EVERYDAY
MINDREADING 51, 51 (Andrew Whiten ed., 1991); Peter LaFreniere, The Ontogeny of Tactical Decep-
tion in Humans, in MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLIGENCE: SOCIAL EXPERTISE AND THE EVOLUTION OF
INTELLECT IN MONKEYS, APES, AND HUMANS 238 (Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten eds., 1988);
Michael E. Vasek, supra note 190.
201. Paul Newton et al., Children’s Everyday Deception and Performance on False-Belief Tasks, 18
BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 297 (2000).
202. See id.
203. Michael Lewis et al., Deception in 3-Year-Olds, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 439 (1989).
204. Id. at 440.
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returned and asked the children if they had peeked, the majority (sixty-two per-
cent) either denied that they had peeked or did not answer.205  Of those children
who did not admit their transgression, sixty-one percent emphatically denied
looking at the forbidden toy.206  Facial expression and bodily activity did not dif-
ferentiate those children who attempted to deceive from children who told the
truth.207  The researchers concluded that deception strategies are adopted at
early ages, and suggested that socialization factors may contribute to the devel-
opment of deception strategies.208  For example, parents tell children not to lie,
but both directly and indirectly, parents tell their children that deception is so-
cially appropriate, such as when children are told to pretend to like a gift that
they do not really like.209
A study by Michael Chandler, Anna Fritz, and Suzanne Hala, found that
children as young as two and one-half could engage in a range of deceptive
strategies. 210  In this study, children aged two, three, and four were shown a
board game in which children were encouraged to hide a “treasure” in one of
several differently colored plastic containers with the aid of a puppet.211  The
movements of the puppet could be tracked by a set of footprints that the puppet
left on the board.212  Children were asked to hide the treasure in one of the con-
tainers and prevent one of the experimenters, who waited outside of the room,
from finding the treasure as part of a game.213  At each trial, children were en-
couraged to use different strategies to deceive the experimenter.214  The decep-
tive options that children could engage in as part of the game strategy included:
(1) withholding information; (2) wiping out the puppet’s tracks in order to de-
stroy evidence of the true hiding location; (3) openly lying about the location of
the treasure by directing the experimenter to search in one of the empty con-
tainers; and (4) falsely nominating one or more of the empty containers as the
true hiding place by either laying false tracks, or by both wiping up the true
tracks and laying down a set of false tracks.215  The researchers found that chil-
dren in all three age groups used each of the strategies available to them.216
There were no significant differences between age and the use of these decep-
tive techniques.217
205. Id. at 441.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 440-41.
208. Id. at 442.
209. Id.
210. See generally Michael Chandler et al., Small-Scale Deceit: Deception as a Marker of Two-,
Three-, and Four-Year-Olds’ Early Theory of Mind, 60 CHILD DEV. 1263 (1989).
211. Id. at 1269-70.
212. Id. at 1270.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1272.
216. Id. at 1273.
217. Id. at 1272-74; see also Suzanne Hala et al., Fledgling Theories of Mind: Deception as a Marker
of Three-Year-Olds’ Understanding of False Belief, 62 CHILD DEV. 83 (1991).
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In a recent article, Paul Newton, Vasudevi Reddy, and Ray Bull describe
two studies of everyday deception in young children.218  In the first study,
twenty-four mothers of three- to four-year-olds were asked to keep a diary of
their children’s apparent deceptive behaviors.  Mothers were instructed in the
kinds of behavior to be recorded and were reminded of these categories and ex-
amples prior to each observation period.  Semi-structured interviews were also
conducted with each mother every two weeks during the month-long observa-
tion periods.  Fourteen forms of deception were identified during the observa-
tion periods, including false denials, false blame, false excuses, trickery, and
false stories.  From the fourteen forms of deception, five categories were identi-
fied: avoidance of discomfort (either physical or psychological), material gain,
amusement, various, and unclear.  During the observation periods, all children
denied doing something that they were not supposed to do, all children faked
an excuse to avoid doing something that they did not want to do, and all had
faked an excuse in order to get something that they wanted.  The majority of
children attempted trickery (ninety-two percent), falsely blamed someone else
(eighty-three percent), falsely claimed completion of a task (seventy-nine per-
cent), and falsely claimed permission (sixty-seven percent).  Although some de-
ceptive responses were made in response to pressing questions and demands
from mothers, other deceptive behaviors were found to be spontaneous and
creative.
In a second study, the deceptive behaviors of a two-and-one-half-year-old
were observed over a six-month period.  As was found with the older children
in the first study, the two-and-one-half-year-old child frequently used false de-
nials and false permission assertions, but rarely lied in the form of false excuses.
In addition, the child’s deceptive behaviors were often observed to be sponta-
neous, generally appropriate to the situation, and involving the use of a variety
of deceptive forms.  Thus, we have some evidence that very young children are
capable of various forms of deceptive behaviors, both verbal and non-verbal.
Although it is still unclear when young children attain the ability to engage in
higher order deception (inference of the mental states of others), young chil-
dren do have some capacity to engage in sophisticated forms of deception.219
What are some factors that motivate children to engage in deceptions?  Paul
Ekman outlined several basic motivations for lying: to avoid punishment; to get
something you could not otherwise get; to protect friends from trouble; to pro-
tect self or others from harm; to avoid embarrassment; to maintain privacy; and
to demonstrate power over authority.220  Bella DePaulo and Audrey Jordan sug-
gest that lies to avoid punishment emerge first, followed by lies aimed at at-
taining material gain, and lies of self-presentation. 221  The study by Paul Newton
218. Newton, supra note 201.
219. Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and
Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 403 (1993).
220. See generally PAUL EKMAN, WHY KIDS LIE (1989).
221. Bella M. DePaulo & Audrey Jordan, Age Changes in Deceiving and Detecting Deceit, in
DEVELOPMENT OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 151 (Robert S. Feldman ed., 1982).
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and colleagues provides some support for this assertion because the most fre-
quent motivating factors observed in young children were found to be avoid-
ance of punishment, material gain, and avoidance of embarrassment. 222
A crucial question in the evaluation of children’s testimony concerns the ex-
tent to which children can be motivated or coached to lie by an adult.  To
simulate more closely the conditions under which false allegations of abuse are
made, Carol Tate and Amye Warren-Leubecker223 conducted a study to exam-
ine the extent to which children could be coached into giving false descriptions
of events, and to examine children’s ability to provide convincing coached de-
scriptions to an adult who does not know that the child is lying.  Forty children
(between the ages of two and one-half and eight years) interacted with an ex-
perimenter with whom they had already become familiar.  The experimenter
told the children in the experimental condition (twenty children) that they
should fool a second experimenter by lying about having played with a target
toy that they had not played with.  After the child consented, the experimenter
and child rehearsed the story that they would tell the second experimenter.  In
the control condition (twenty children), children did play with the target toy.
Fifteen of the children in the experimental condition agreed to play the trick;
five children hesitated but then agreed to play the trick.  Only twelve (sixty per-
cent) of the children actually carried out the deceptive plan.  Of these twelve
children, two immediately told the interviewer the lie as she entered the room
without being asked.  One of the children spontaneously confessed during the
specific questioning portion of the interview.  One child confessed when asked
“Is that what you really did?” Another child confessed as soon as the interview
was completed.  Thus, seven children (thirty-five percent) maintained the de-
ception throughout.  The children who carried out the deception throughout the
experimental period were older children.  It was found that the seven children
who lied throughout the experiment provided significantly shorter descriptions
of their activities than did control children.  The authors concluded that chil-
dren can be coached into providing deceptive information in the context of a
trick, but that the coaching did not work well or last for very long in the major-
ity of the children (sixty-five percent).  The coaching worked best either with
children who knew the co-conspirator well or with older children.
Jeff Haugaard and his colleagues examined how children define lying when
the lie is made at the direction of a parent. 224  The main question in this study
was: “Do young children believe that if a parent tells them to make a particular
statement, that statement is then true, whether or not it is accurate?”225  This is
of concern because if the child comes to believe that a statement is true even
when it is not, “the child could speak ‘the truth’ in a way that could mislead a
222. See generally Newton, supra note 201.
223. See generally Tate, supra note 192.
224. Jeff  J. Haugaard et al., Children’s Definitions of the Truth and Their Competency as Witnesses
in Legal Proceedings, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 258 (1991).
225. Id.
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jury.”226  Fifty-six preschool children, eighty-six kindergarten children, and
twenty-three college students were shown one of two videotapes.  The videos
depicted a girl playing in a neighbor’s pond.  Previously, the child had been
warned by the neighbor not to play in the pond.  The neighbor finds the girl
playing in the pond (approaching her to within four feet but never touching her)
and tells her that he will report her to the police.  The neighbor then sends her
home.  The girl returns home and eventually talks to a policeman.  In one ver-
sion of the video, the girl goes to her room and waits by herself for the police-
man.  In the second version, the girl goes to her room and speaks with her
mother.  The girl proceeds to tell her mother what occurred.  The mother di-
rects the girl to tell the policeman that the neighbor hit her.  The results indi-
cated that, among the child participants, twenty-nine percent stated incorrectly
that the neighbor had hit the girl.
Another potential motivating factor in telling a lie was also investigated—
lying to protect a friend.  After the children participated in the video portion of
the experiment, children were also instructed to read a vignette about a young
girl who is told by her teacher that she must stay in the classroom instead of
going to recess.  The girl goes to recess anyway and plays with a friend.  Later,
the teacher asks the friend if the girl stayed in the classroom.  The friend tells
the teacher a lie in order to protect the girl.  When children were asked if the
friend had lied to the teacher ninety-one percent stated that the friend had lied,
and nine percent indicated that the friend had told the truth.  Although most
children in this study correctly stated that making an inaccurate statement, ei-
ther at the request of a parent or to protect a friend, is a lie, a small but non-
trivial portion of children were influenced by parental direction or the desire to
protect a friend.
Haugaard cautions, however, that this study cannot answer the question of
how many children would actually lie at the direction of a parent, nor can this
study answer the question of how many children would lie about a potentially
serious event, such as abuse, at the direction of a parent. 227  Therefore, care
must be exercised when generalizing from this study to actual cases.  The results
from this study suggest, however, that parental directions to engage in deceptive
behavior may have a strong influence on at least some children.
Finally, it is important to consider how skillful children are at lying.  Some
researchers have found age differences in deceptive ability, with older children
tending to be more successful liars than younger children. Bella DePaulo and
Audrey Jordan, for instance, found that young children (first graders) were un-
skilled liars. 228  When young children lied, their true emotions often leaked out
through facial expressions, body language, and tone of voice.229  Susan Leekam
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Bella M. DePaulo & Audrey Jordan, Age Changes in Deceiving and Detecting Deceit, in
DEVELOPMENT OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 151 (Robert S. Feldman ed., 1982).
229. See, e.g., Vasek, supra note 190.
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suggests that children become better at lying as they come to acquire higher or-
der levels of deception. 230  More research, however, is necessary to determine if
there are developmental changes in the ability to lie convincingly.
In sum, even very young children engage in deceptive behaviors.  They do
so in response to motivating factors such as avoiding punishment, attaining ma-
terial gain, and avoiding embarrassment.  Children’s skill at carrying out decep-
tion may increase with age, although few researchers have examined this issue
systematically.  At least some children’s evaluations of truth-telling and lying
may be influenced by parental direction, although how this generalizes to chil-
dren’s actual behavior, particularly in more serious cases of deception such as
abuse, needs further study.
B. Conclusion
Idaho v. Wright’s distinction between immediately surrounding circum-
stances and corroboration requires judges to close their eyes to evidence that
can be highly probative of reliability.  Hopefully, the Court will someday re-
move the distorting blinders imposed in Wright and put the “totality” back into
“totality of the circumstances.”
Psychological research sheds light on many of the circumstances that are
relevant to reliability, and judges can use this research to inform their decisions.
In the final analysis, however, decisions about reliability are exceedingly com-
plex judgments that should be based not only on psychological science but also
on experience, logic, and common sense.  Psychology can inform the decision-
making process, but cannot replace it.
V
A SAMPLE OF FIFTY CASES
Do courts scrutinize children’s hearsay statements carefully?  Or do they
“let it all in”?  To gain a measure of insight into judicial handling of hearsay, we
examined fifty appellate decisions from 1990 to 2000.231  Thirty were state cases
(sixty percent) and twenty were federal or military decisions (forty percent).
All but three were criminal prosecutions.232  We limited our sample to child sex-
ual abuse cases in which children’s hearsay was offered under a medical diagno-
sis or treatment exception, a residual or child exception, or both.233  We located
cases through Westlaw, employing various search terms.  We included only
cases where, in our judgment, the decision contained a useful discussion of
230. Susan R. Leekam, Believing and Deceiving: Steps to Becoming a Good Liar, in COGNITIVE
AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN EARLY DECEPTION 47 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1992).
231. 1990—4 cases; 1991—4 cases; 1992—8 cases; 1993—11 cases; 1994—5 cases; 1995—1 case;
1996—2 cases; 1997—1 case; 1998—3 cases; 1999—7 cases; 2000—4 cases.
232. The three non-criminal cases were juvenile court child protection cases.
233. We do not mean to say that other hearsay exceptions were not involved in the cases we exam-
ined.  For example, some of the cases in our sample involved excited utterances, prior consistent state-
ments, and so forth.  The one constant in our sample was that every case involved the medical diagnosis
or treatment exception, or the residual exception, or both.
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hearsay.  As a result, many decisions were excluded where hearsay was men-
tioned only tangentially.  Apart from excluding cases with superficial hearsay
analysis, our overall goal was to obtain a relatively representative sample of
cases from 1990 to 2000.  We realize that our sample of cases is not random in
the scientific sense, and that our findings are subjective.
In our sample of fifty cases, there were fifty-six child victims.  Children
ranged in age from two to nineteen years.  The average age was 6.8 years.  Fe-
males comprised eighty-eight percent of the victims; males comprised twelve
percent.  Children testified in most cases.  In thirteen cases (twenty-six percent),
however, the child did not testify.234  When children did not testify, the most
common reason was that the child was too young.
We were particularly interested in how often convictions were reversed be-
cause of the erroneous admission of hearsay.235  Margaret Berger pointed out
that in the ordinary course of civil and criminal litigation, “an evidentiary error
alone is not very likely to induce the reviewing court to term the error ‘reversi-
ble.’”236  Although Roger Park noted that “appellate courts produce an ample
number of hearsay reversals,”237 the odds of reversal on hearsay grounds are
small.  Professors Park and Steven Penrod examined hearsay issues in federal
court from 1960 to 1988, and found that only one in 107 reversals was due to
hearsay.238  A later study found that only one in 220 reversals was due to hear-
say.239
The first author has been reading state and federal child abuse cases for
years.  The impression gained by such study is that reversals due to hearsay are
not uncommon in child abuse cases.  Professor Mosteller shares this impres-
sion.240  In our sample of fifty cases, thirty-four (sixty-five percent) were af-
firmed; eighteen (thirty-five percent) were reversed.  A reversal rate of thirty-
five percent seems high.  For comparison, we examined fifty recent appellate
court decisions involving rape of an adult.  Ninety percent of the convictions
were affirmed; ten percent were reversed.  During the twelve-month period
ending June 30, 1997, the reversal rate for all types of criminal cases in federal
234. In another study of actual court cases, the present authors and their colleagues examined forty-
two child sexual abuse trials in Arizona and California.  In these cases, children testified in every case.
John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 388 (1999).
235. The first author studied reversal rates in child sexual abuse prosecutions from 1900 to 1950.
John E.B. Myers et al., Professional Writing on Child Sexual Abuse from 1900 to 1975: Dominant
Themes and Impact on Prosecution, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 201 (1999).  The reversal rate in child
sexual abuse cases over these decades was similar to the reversal rate for other crimes.  See id.
236. Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 895 (1992).
237. Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 648 (1998).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Mosteller, supra note 22, at 60.
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court was 9.1%.241  Wayne LaFave and Jerold Israel estimate that the reversal
rate for all crimes “tends to fall within the range of 10-20%.”242
We examined the eighteen cases in our sample that were reversed to see
how many of the reversals were due to hearsay.  Twelve of the eighteen rever-
sals (sixty-seven percent) were due to error regarding hearsay.  The fact that
sixty-seven percent of the reversals in our sample were due to hearsay appears
to indicate a rather high reversal rate.  In our survey of the fifty rape cases in-
volving adult victims, hearsay almost never figured in the court’s decision to re-
verse.
Of course, our sixty-seven percent hearsay reversal statistic must be re-
garded with caution.  We selected cases in which courts devoted more than
passing attention to hearsay.  It is likely that a court that is troubled by hearsay,
and that is on its way to reversal on that ground, will devote more time to the
subject than a court less preoccupied.  Despite this caveat, our examination of
these fifty cases, coupled with fifteen years of reading appellate cases on hear-
say, leads us to conclude that in the context of child abuse, courts police the
hearsay rule with care.  Indeed, we believe that during the past five years, courts
have become increasingly strict about children’s hearsay.
VI
CONCLUSION
Psychology and law are strange bedfellows.  Psychological science is based
on empiricism and the scientific method.  Law grows from experience and
logic.243  Until recently, hearsay exceptions partook entirely of law, unsullied by
psychological science.  This is no longer the case.  Modern psychological science
sheds increasing light on the criteria used to determine the admissibility of
hearsay.  We see no reason to bemoan this development.  Indeed, the law
should welcome reliable insights from psychology.  Will the day arrive when
psychological science entirely replaces legal analysis in hearsay decision mak-
ing?  We doubt it.  The rationale behind excited utterances has not been tested
empirically, and may be difficult to put to the scientific test.  Decision making
under this exception rests on an intuitive guess about trauma and truth.
Turning to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception, whether or not
children of different ages understand the significance of telling the truth to doc-
tors is subject to empirical analysis and has been studied.  Thus, psychology
provides valuable age-specific information.  Here, too, however, individualized
judgment is required.  The question in every case is whether this particular child
understood the need for candor. Psychology can inform us about children in
241. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, Table B-5 (1997).
242. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29 (2d ed. 1992).
243. With apologies to Justice Holmes, who said that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.”  OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed., 1963).
MYERS_FMT.DOC 12/05/01  11:28 AM
46 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
general, but cannot tell us whether a particular child was motivated to tell the
truth on a particular occasion.
As for the residual and child hearsay exceptions, psychology sheds light on
several of the circumstances related to reliability.  Whether hearsay is suffi-
ciently reliable to gain admission in evidence, however, is too complex a matter
to be reduced to a formula.
In recent years, the ratio of intuition to psychological science has adjusted
slightly in the direction of science, although hearsay remains five parts law to
one part psychology.  The ratio will undoubtedly see further adjustment in the
future.
It is fashionable among academics to criticize courts.  We have done so our-
selves by questioning the Supreme Court’s distinction between circumstances
that immediately surround out-of-court statements and circumstances that
“merely” corroborate.  Putting criticism aside, however, we believe that during
the past twenty years, American courts have done a good job implementing the
hearsay rule and its exceptions.  Mistakes have occurred, but that is true in all
areas of law, not just evidentiary rulings in child abuse cases.  In our experience,
judges in these difficult cases take the hearsay rule seriously, and try their best
to be fair.  Given the complexity of the task, the courts deserve high marks.
